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COMMENT
I AIN'T GOT NO BODY: THE MORAL
UNCERTAINTY OF BODILESS MURDER
JURISPRUDENCE IN NEW YORK AFTER
PEOPLE V. BIERENBAUM
Francis Paul Greene*
"[M]urder is always a mistake. One should never do anything that
one cannot talk about after dinner."'
"Murder will out; we see that every day."2
INTRODUCTION
On July 5, 1998, Manhattan socialite and former ballerina, Ms.
Irene Silverman, disappeared.' The same day, police stopped a
mother and son grifter team, Sante and Kenneth Kimes, a few blocks
away from Ms. Silverman's apartment on an unrelated theft and
forgery warrant from Utah.4 After searching the Kimeses and their
car, police found loaded handguns, a stun-gun, plastic handcuffs and
$30,000 in cash.' They also found tape-recordings of Ms. Silverman's
phone conversations-ostensibly taken from wiretaps-and a forged
deed which purported to transfer ownership of Ms. Silverman's multi-
million dollar Manhattan townhouse to the Kimeses.6 A few months
later, despite the fact that Ms. Silverman's body had not been found
* I.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., 2002, New York
University, Germanic Languages and Literatures. I dedicate this Comment to my
mother, my father, my stepfather, Barry, and my wife, Jacqueline. Without their
collective support and encouragement, this project would have never come to fruition.
I also wish to extend special thanks to Professor Abraham Abramovsky for his
continuing aid and guidance.
1. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, in The Complete Oscar Wilde 154(1891).
2. Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, The Nun's Priest's Tale 144 (Simon
& Schuster Inc. 1971).
3. People v. Kimes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 2000, at 31 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2000).
4. Id.
5. Bryan Robinson, Mother and Son 'Grifters' Convicted, at





and several investigations discovered no physical evidence of a crime,
the Kimeses were charged with murder. Jury selection for their trial
began in 1999, and the pair was convicted on May 18, 2000.'
Despite its "screen value," the Kimes/Silverman case 9 also involved
a unique jurisprudential question: can a person be convicted of
murder where there is no body, no forensic evidence and no
admission of guilt? A guilty verdict in a murder trial based entirely on
circumstantial evidence had been an accepted part of the common law
since the 1792 case of The King v. Hindmarsh," and of New York
jurisprudence since at least People v. Lipsky in 1982.''
Nevertheless, the prosecution of murder in absence of a body or
any other direct evidence was rare. Indeed, the Kimeses' guilty verdict
for murder was the first obtained in New York without a body, a
confession, or any physical evidence of a crime whatsoever. 2 The
Kimeses' verdict would not remain unique for long. Less than a year
after the Kimeses were arrested, investigators re-opened a fifteen-
year-old missing persons case and Dr. Robert Bierenbaum, a plastic
surgeon and amateur pilot, was charged with the murder of his wife
who had gone missing without a trace.' The prosecution claimed that
Bierenbaum killed his wife in their Upper East Side apartment and
then dumped her body into the ocean from a private rented plane. 4
As was true in the Kimes affair, the Bierenbaum case attracted
significant media coverage and was featured prominently on the small
screen, rating in turn its own "Law & Order" episode. 5 Like the
Kimses, Bierenbaum was also convicted, receiving in his case a
sentence of twenty years to life for the murder of his wife."h
7. See David Rohde, Mother and Son Arraigned In Woman's Disappearance,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1999, at B3.
8. See Robinson, supra note 5.
9. It was the subject of a CourtTV "Mugshots" episode (entitled Sante and
Kenneth Kimes: Murderous Mother, Deadly Son) and a Lifetime Network made-for-
TV movie starring Mary Tyler Moore as Santc Kirnes (entitled Like Mother, Like
Son: The Strange Story of Sante and Kenny Kimes). See CourtTV OnAir, at
http://www.courttv.com/onair/shows/nugshots/episodes/kimes.htnil (last visited Mar.
13, 2003); E! Online - Movie Facts - Like Mother, Like Son: The Strange Story of
Sante and Kenny Kimes (2001), at http://www.eonline.com/Facts/Movies/
0,69,82834,00.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
10. See 168 Eng. Rep. 387 (1792).
11. See 443 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1982). Note that both Hindmarsh and Lipsky
involved other types of evidence (eyewitnesses in Hindmarsh and a confession in
Lipsky), not present in the Kimeses' case.
12. See Michael A. Riccardi, Murder Trial Against Plastic Surgeon Begins Without
Body, Circumstantial Evidence Relied On, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 2000, at 1.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Law & Order: The Good Doctor (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 25, 2001)
see Casebook-G, at http://wolfstories2.tripod.com/id72.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2003).
16. See Christine Dorsey. Bierenbauon Sentencing: Former LV Doctor Gets 20-to-
life, available at http://www.lvrj.com/Ivrj home/2000/Nov-30-Thu2000/news/14932332.
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This Comment investigates the jurisprudence of murder in the
absence of a body (termed bodiless murder for expediency) in New
York as well as crises created therein by the Appellate Division's
decision in People v. Bierenbaum.7 Although by all appearances a
settled area of the law since Hindmarsh and Lipsky, bodiless murder
trials function as a lightning rod for difficult issues from other
jurisprudential areas, including questions of circumstantial evidence,
character evidence, and the establishment of corpus delicti.
Part I.A provides a general outline of bodiless murder
jurisprudence. It begins by tracing the development of the bodiless
murder law from its beginnings in eighteenth-century England
through the present." It outlines the influential rule laid down by
Lord Matthew Hale," which urged caution in bodiless murder cases,
and the way in which the Hale rule has been applied in both English
and American case and statutory law.2 ' Part I.A then goes on to
examine the notion of corpus delicti as well as the conceptually
distinct corpus delicti rule2 -a doctrine which has accompanied most
discussions of Lord Hale's rule, but which must be distinguished from
the present discussion, since it applies only to a specific subcategory of
bodiless murder cases, i.e. those in which defendants admit their guilt.
The final section of Part I.A brings this distinction to the fore,
inasmuch as it focuses on the unique issues raised by bodiless murder
cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence where defendants do
not confess.22
In Part I.B, the discussion turns to the moral certainty instruction
traditionally given in all cases built entirely on circumstantial
evidence. It begins by examining the two-part process inherent to the
use of circumstantial evidence, and then provides a brief history of the
court's penchant for caution in cases in which no direct evidence of a
crime is available.23 Part 1.13 then goes on to examine the way in
which the moral certainty instruction functions more like a procedural
safeguard than a discrete standard of proof.24 Part I.B also examines
recent developments in the moral certainty instruction, including the
way in which both case law and revisions of the Criminal Jury
Instructions have ostensibly weakened it.25 The final section of Part
I.B. shows, however, how the current permutation of the moral
html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
17. 748 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2002).
18. See infra Part I.A.I.
19. See infra Part I.A.l.a.
20. See infra Part 1.A.1.b.
21. See infra Part I.A.2.
22. See infra Part I.A.3.
23. See infra Part I.BI.
24. See infra Part 1.B.2.
25. See infra Part 1.B.3.
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certainty instruction continues to provide an important bulwark
against haste and impermissible reasoning in circumstantial cases.26
Part II investigates the way in which each of these cases considered
the HalelHindmarsh rule and balanced the need to punish with the
danger of false conviction. As will become apparent, the current
dismissal of the HalelHindmarsh rule has created an atmosphere in
which a court may accept previously suspect categories of evidence
(consciousness-of-guilt evidence as well as opportunity and motive
when presented alone) as sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
Part II.A investigates the Court of Appeals' strict interpretation of
the Hale rule (minus its Hindmarsh exception) in Ruloff v. People."7
Part II.B follows the court in its return to a broader interpretation of
the HalelHindmarsh rule in Lipsky.2x Part II.C charts the Appellate
Division's path from the middle ground of Lipsky to the
permissiveness of Bierenbaurm, which circumvents the
HalelHindmarsh rule and summarily rejects the long tradition of
caution in bodiless murder cases.29
Part III.A focuses on the aftereffects of Bierenbaum. Part III.A.1
discusses the implications of Bierenbaurm for bodiless murder cases,
inasmuch as it makes the faulty math of 0 + 0 = 1 a valid precedent."'
Part III.A.2 explores the import of Bierenbaum as an evidentiary
precedent generally, especially in cases involving domestic violence. 1
In such cases, Bierenbaum has created a presumption of guilt based on
character evidence which is both impermissible and nearly impossible
to overcome. Part I1.B outlines remedies available to the Court of
Appeals, which could mitigate the damage Bierenbaum, and its
underlying logic, can cause. Part III.B.1 focuses on the specific action
required by the Court of Appeals to make any such remedy effective
and Part IlI.B.2 presents two exemplary responses to the problem of
bodiless murder from other jurisdictions.1 2
1. BODILESS MURDER AND THE MORAL CERTAINTY STANDARD
Bodiless murder cannot be examined in a vacuum. Indeed, as
suggested above, it is less a legal phenomenon per se, than a kind of
focal point for the discussion of other troublesome areas of criminal
law. This part provides a contextual background for the discussion of
the New York jurisprudence of bodiless murder in a two step process.
It begins by outlining the development of bodiless murder
26. See infra Part I.B.4.
27. 18 N.Y. 179 (1858); see infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part 11.B.
29. See infra Part I I.C.
30. See infra Part II.A.I.
31. See infra Part III.A.2.
32. See infra Parts III.B.I-B.2.
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jurisprudence from its beginnings in eighteenth-century England to
the present day in New York.33 It then provides a brief history of the
related moral certainty instruction given to New York juries in cases
based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
A. Bodiless Murder: A Brief History
Murder is a tricky business. In addition to causing the death of the
victim, the act of wrongfully killing another human being can create
circumstances that tend to erase any trace of a crime. Murderers may,
for instance, push their victims into vats of molten steel, dispose of
their bodies in acid or fit them with proverbial concrete galoshes.
Whatever the circumstances, whenever the victim's body disappears in
the course of a murder, the courts face the challenge of not only
deciding on innocence or guilt, but also determining whether the very
substance of the crime-a wrongful killing-ever happened in the first
place.35
1. The Beginnings of Bodiless Murder Jurisprudence
In the long history of capital punishment, murder has always come
first on the list of those crimes punishable by death.36 Given that
history, a special risk has accompanied bodiless murder cases: that the
state may execute a "murderer," only to have the "victim" later
reappear, very much alive.37  In the eighteenth century-an age in
which it was much easier for a person to disappear without a trace,
and much more difficult for someone who had been spirited away to
make contact with those at home-this risk was a subject of real
concern, not just script-fodder for melodramas."
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See generally Rollin M. Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. Rev.
173 (1962).
36. See Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 5, 6, 8 (2002)
(listing murder as foremost among the capital crimes in the American colonies); Brian
P. Block & John Hostettler, Hanging in the Balance: A History of the Abolition of
Capital Punishment in Britain vii, 18 (1997) (describing murder as one of the
perennial capital crimes); The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies 36-
38 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (listing murder as first among capital crimes listed
in many states that engaged in capital punishment); V.A.C. Gatrell, The Hanging
Tree: Execution and the English People 1770-1868, at 10, 100-01 (1994) (describing
the tradition of public hanging for murder in England as compared to the tendency
toward private executions in the United States). On the religious underpinnings of
capital punishment for murder, see Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner:
The Influence of Western Religion on the Death Penalty, 9 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
137, 142-45 (2000).
37. See Perkins, supra note 35, at 173-76.
38. On the way in which television has tweaked the "returning murder victim"
scenario to its own ends, see Urban Legends Reference Pages: Legal Affairs (I Ain't




a. The Hale Doctrine
Two bodiless murder cases from the eighteenth century led to a
reticence on the part of some early commentators to support
convictions for murder in the absence of any trace of a corpse." In
one of the earliest recorded cases, an uncle was found guilty of killing
his niece after she disappeared.4 Witnesses testified that the niece
had begged her uncle not to kill her when he had once punished her
previously." The court demanded that the uncle produce his niece,
but instead he presented them with an imposter." After the discovery
of this subterfuge and his subsequent conviction, the uncle was
executed, only to have the niece return when she came of age to claim
her rights in probate. 3 In a second case, a man who helped kidnap
another man was executed for murder. 4   The "victim," however,
returned safe and sound, having been detained after the kidnapping.45
These cases appear in Lord Matthew Hale's Pleas of the Crown,
where they provide support for his oft-quoted axiom, "I would never
convict any person of murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were
proved to be done, or at least the body found."4" Courts have often
misread this statement to stand for the proposition that Hale was
against any murder conviction in the absence of a corpse.47 To stress
the importance of the phrase, "unless the fact were proved to be
done" to his axiom, Lord Hale presented a discussion of another
bodiless murder case, The King v. Hindnarsh.48







46. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Lipsky, 445 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (App. Div. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Connors, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 461, 465 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1987): McDuff v.
State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 354
(Utah 1957); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 294 S.E.2d 882, 890 (Va. 1982). Lord
Matthew Hale (1609-1676) was Lord Chief Justice of England from 1671 until 1676,
when he resigned due to ill health. His History of the Pleas of the Crown has become a
seminal work in the jurisprudence of common-law criminal offenses. See Sir Matthew
Hale (1609-1676) English Jurist, 17th Century, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
medallion/hale/hale.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
47. See, e.g., Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179, 187 (1858) (truncating Lord Hale's
axiom down to its second alternative, i.e. that one never "convict any person of
murder or manslaughter, till at least the body be found dead"): Epperly, 294 S.E.2d at
890.
48. 168 Eng. Rep. 387 (1792). Since Hindmarsh is cited in Hale's Pleas of the
Crown, and Lord Hale died in 1676, it is clear that the Hindmarsh case was not




b. Hindmarsh and Its Progeny
In Hindmarsh, a ship's hand was convicted of murdering his captain
and throwing the body overboard. 9 Evidence at the trial included
testimony from an eyewitness who saw Hindmarsh throw the captain
into the water, a bloody plank and bloodstains on Hindmarsh's
clothes." The defense argued that without a dead body, the
prosecution could not prove its corpus delicti, or body of the crime."
Even if the ship's hand had struck the captain and heaved him
overboard, without some trace of the corpse, no direct proof existed
that the captain was dead. The defense contended that the captain
could have been rescued by other ships shown to have been in the
area at the time. In response, the court admitted the general rule of
law that without proof of death, no murder conviction could stand.53
Although the captain was almost surely dead, all the court had before
it was circumstantial evidence that he had been killed-at least by
drowning. Hindmarsh, however, faced two charges: one for murder
by beating and one for murder by drowning. The court was therefore
able to obviate the difficult question of whether a murder conviction
could stand on circumstantial evidence alone by charging the jury that
if it found that Hindmarsh had killed the captain before his body hit
the water, it could convict.54  The jury weighed the question
accordingly and found Hindmarsh guilty.
59
Many courts have since read Hindmarsh to stand for the
proposition that circumstantial evidence of murder can overwhelm the
usual necessity of a dead body, or parts thereof." In this sense,
Hindmarsh, or at least its application, is less of an exception to Hale's
rule than an example of its first condition for a murder conviction, i.e.,
that none should stand "unless the fact were proved to be done. '57 As
a result, what Hindmarsh, or at least its progeny, now stands for is that
49. See id. at 387-88.
50. See id. at 388.
5 1. See id. For a discussion of the notion of corpus delicti and the way it has been
misunderstood in murder cases, see infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
52. See Hindmarsh, 168 Eng. Rep. at 388. To support its argument, the defense
cited a case in which two parents had thrown their infant child into the harbor at
Liverpool and were charged with murdering her. Justice Gould directed an acquittal
because there was no proof that the child was killed and because it was possible that
the tide had carried it away to safety. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 387-88. Note that in Hindmarsh, there was eyewitness testimony
that Hindmarsh had beaten the captain and thrown him overboard. Id. at 388.
55. See id. at 388.
56. See United States v. Elmore, 31 M.J. 678, 683 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990); People v.
Williams. 373 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Mich. 1985); State v. Hansen, 989 P.2d 338, 344
(Mont. 1999); People v. Lipsky, 445 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664 (App. Div. 1981); State v.
Nicely, 529 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ohio 1988).
57. See Hale. supra note 39.
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in exceptional cases, the corpus delicti of murder may be proven
through circumstantial evidence.
The policy arguments both for and against the Hindmarsh
exception are strong. Supporting the reliance upon circumstantial
evidence in cases such as Hindmarsh is the notion that any absolute
bar on murder convictions where no body is found would 1) reward
murderers who were especially good at disposing of their victims'
corpses, and 2) condone and perhaps even encourage murder in
situations in which it is easier to dispose of a corpse, for instance on
the high seas.59 An authority of no less stature than Blackstone
rejected the Hindmarsh exception, stating an equally compelling
truism that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer. 60
For a time, Blackstone's truism, underscored by the above examples
of overly hasty executions, won out, leading several states to write a
restrictive version of Hale's rule into their statutory codes." Indeed,
Texas had such a "no body-no conviction" rule until (and arguably
after) 1974.62 New York had a similar rule, requiring direct evidence
of death or of violence sufficient to cause death for a conviction of
murder.63 Where they were enacted, however, legislatures began to
repeal these statutes in the second half of the twentieth century,
succumbing to growing support for a modernized version of the
Hindmarsh policy argument.64
58. See supra note 56.
59. See Williams, 373 N.W.2d at 571: see also United States v. Gibert. 25 F. Cas.
1287, 1290 (C.C. Mass. 1834) ("In the cases of murders committed on the high seas,
the body is rarely if ever found; and a more complete encouragement and protection
for the worst offences of this sort could not be invented, than a rule of this
strictness."); People v. Manson, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 298 (Cal. CI. App. 1977) ("The
fact that a murderer may successfully dispose of the body of the victim does not
entitle him to an acquittal. That is one form of success for which society has no
reward."); State v. Zarinsky, 362 A.2d 611, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
("Surely, the successful concealment or destruction of the victim's body should not
preclude prosecution of his or her killer where proof of guilt can be established
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
60. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *358.
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 1041 (1919); Tex. Pen. Code art. 1204 (Vernon
1961) (providing that -[n]o person shall be convicted of any grade of homicide unless
the body of the deceased, or portions of it, are found and sufficiently identified to
establish the fact of the death of the person charged to have been killed").
62. Even after the Texas legislature declined to include the requirement that a
body be found for a murder conviction to stand in its 1974 revision of its Penal Code,
courts in Texas still applied the old Article 1204 rule. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 738
S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987); Penry v. State,
691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986). In Fisher
v. State, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals officially put an end to the practice
when it pointed out that decisions after the 1974 demise of Article 1204 were
erroneously based on a decision dealing with pre-1974 law. See Fisher v. State, 851
S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
63. See N.Y. Penal Law § 1041.
64. All state jurisdictions now allow for a murder conviction for murder without a
2870 [Vol. 71
BODILESS MURDER
2. Corpus Delicti and the Corpus Delicti Rule
At the center of the HalelHindmarsh discussion is the notion of
corpus delicti. Despite the widespread misconception that the term
corpus delicti refers to a dead body, Black's Law Dictionary tells us
that it refers instead to the "body of the crime,"65 or the set of
circumstances that defines any single criminal act. Although no more
related to murder than to any other crime, controversy surrounding
corpus delicti arises most often in murder cases without a body.66
Indeed, proof of corpus delicti is tantamount to proof of what has
been called actus reus, or "[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the
physical components of a crime."67 Wigmore states that:
[l]t is clear that an analysis of every crime, with reference to this
element of it, reveals three component parts, first, the occurrence of
the specific kind of injury or loss (as, in homicide, a person
deceased ... ); secondly, somebody's criminality.., as the source of
the loss,-these two together involving the commission of a crime by
somebody; and thirdly, the accused's identity as the doer of the
crime.6
Since it is a threshold requirement for the prosecution, corpus
delicti must usually be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.69 This is
body. States that have dealt with the issue in their case law include Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington. For a survey of
the case law through 1991, see Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 415-18 (3d Cir.
1991).
65. Black's Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed. 1999).
66. "The phrase 'corpus delicti' does not mean dead body, but body of the crime,
and every offense has its corpus delicti. Its practical importance, however, has been
very largely limited to the homicide cases." Rollin M. Perkins & Roland N. Boyce,
Criminal Law 140 (3d ed. 1982) (internal citations omitted).
67. Black's Law Dictionary 37 (7th ed. 1999); see also Id. at 346 (equating corpus
delicti with actus reus or "the fact of transgression"); Perkins, supra note 35, at 195
(arguing that the corpus delicti and the actus reus of murder are one and the same).
68. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 866 (Chadbourne rev. 1978).
69. For the proposition that the prosecution need prove all the elements of a
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, see Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law §
1.4(a) (3d ed. 2000). In general, it is more efficacious to think of corpus delicti as a
bundle of elements making up an offense. Certainly this bundle includes the physical,
actus reus, elements: in relation to murder these would be 1) the death of a person
and 2) caused by the act of another. However, inasmuch as corpus delicti can include
the element of wrongfulness, it also can incorporate some of the elements usually
subsumed under the category of mens rea. In relation to criminal homicide, as
defined by the Model Penal Code, this would be the knowing, reckless or negligent
act of a person which causes the death of another. See Model Penal Code § 210.1
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). Such definitions conflict with the work of Perkins and
others who equate corpus delicti with actus reus without further qualification.
Compare LaFave, supra, § 1.4(b), with Black's Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed. 1999), and
Perkins, supra note 35, at 195. LaFave also mentions that occasionally the corpus
delicti of murder is said to include only the first of Wigmore's three elements, i.e.,
20031 2871
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not the case, however, in a bodiless murder trial where the
prosecution attempts to introduce an extra-judicial confession by the
defendant into evidence.7
In such a trial, the prosecution has to satisfy what is known as the
corpus delicti rule.7t Confessions can be notoriously unreliable and
extra-judicial confessions doubly so. 72 Indeed, courts, legislatures and
commentators alike have expressed deep suspicion regarding their
reliability.73 According to the corpus delicti rule, an extra-judicial
confession to a crime cannot be admitted without proof aliunde, i.e.
other admissible proof that the crime was committed.74 Since the
corpus delicti rule is usually one of admissibility and not of proof, the
burden of proof facing the prosecution when presenting proof aliunde
to corroborate an extra-judicial confession depends on the burden for
evidentiary determinations in the respective jurisdiction."
Because of the prevalence of confessions in such cases, most of the
jurisprudence on bodiless murder involves the corpus delicti rule.76
Indeed, the unique risk inherent in bodiless murder cases-as
identified by Hale-has been underscored most when extra-judicial
confessions have led to false convictions. A trial for murder in
absence of a body is already an exercise in conjecture and belief, one,
however, that common-law courts have long found necessary.77
"the occurrence of the specific kind of injury or loss (as, in homicide, a person
deceased ... )." See LaFave, supra, § 1.4(b) (citing Wigmore, supra note 68, § 2072
and State v. Ruth, 435 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1980)).
70. See LaFave, supra note 69, § 1.4(b); Perkins, supra note 35, at 177-78.
71. See Perkins, supra note 35, at 177-78.
72. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *357-58 (stating that
confessions are "the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony"). See generally
Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions (U. Chicago P. 2000).
73. In New York, see, for instance., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney
2002) ("A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a
confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense
charged has been committed."): People v. Sweeney, 106 N.E. 913, 918 (N.Y. 1914);
People v. Bennett, 37 N.Y. 117, 133 (N.Y. 1867); see also Joel Cohen & Michelle L.
Pahmer, Corroborating a Defendant's Incriminating Statement, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4,
2)00, at 1; Daniel J. Capra, Declaration Against Penal Interest and Corroborating
Circumstances, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2000, at 3.
74. See State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 57 (N.J. 1959) (arguing that proof aliunde of a
confession in a murder case should consist only of Wigmore's first element of corpus
delicti, i.e., the death of a person). See generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti
Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955).
75. For more on the burden of proof in evidentiary offerings in New York, see
Edith L. Fisch, Fisch on New York Evidence § 1089 (2d ed. 2003).
76. In New York, for instance, there is only one published appellate decision
involving a bodiless murder with no confession or admission whatsoever. See People
v. Bierenbaum, 748 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2002). People v. Lipsky is often cited for
the proposition that in New York no body is necessary for establishment of the corpus
delicti of murder, but even in Lipsky and the case it overrules, Ruloff v. People, the
prosecution presented out of court written statements as admissions. See People v.
Lipsky. 443 N.E.2d 925, 928 (N.Y. 1982): Ruloffv. People, 18 N.Y. 179, 180 (1858).
77. See generally Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 415-18 (3d Cir. 1991)
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Where a conviction with such a shaky foundation is itself based on a
very shaky piece of evidence, i.e. an extra-judicial confession, courts
now proceed with caution.
Perrys' Case is a prime example of the need for such caution. 7' Not
only was Perrys' Case another in the line of cases in which the murder
"'victim" returned safe and sound, it also involved an extra-judicial
confession.79 John Perry, a servant, was sent to search for his master,
Harrison, after the latter went missing during the collection of certain
rents. "' Perry disappeared but was soon found, along with some
broken and bloody articles that had belonged to Harrison. 1
Harrison's body was never found, but Perry gave several inconsistent
stories regarding the murder with which he had been charged. 2 At
first, he denied all guilt but later came up with a story inculpating both
his brother and mother in a botched robbery-turned-murder. On the
basis of Perry's confession, all three were hanged, only to have
Harrison return some time later with a story of having been robbed,
taken by force to Turkey and forced into slavery. 4
On this side of the Atlantic, similar cases have a provenance dating
back at least to 1819. Whatever the history of these cases, the corpus
delicti rule has become entrenched as a tool to combat the dire
consequences that can occur when a defendant is convicted for a
crime that never occurred, based solely on his or her confession s6
New York has incorporated this rule into the New York Criminal
Procedure Law § 60.50, which prohibits convictions for any offense
based on evidence of confession alone. 7 Because this Comment
focuses exclusively on the controversies surrounding murder cases in
absence of any direct evidence whatsoever, including either
confessions or admissions, the corpus delicti rule is only of importance
inasmuch as it must be distinguished from the present discussion.
(providing an extensive survey of the case law jurisprudence of bodiless murder
through 1991); Perkins, supra note 35 (outlining the history of bodiless murder in
eighteenth-century England and the United States).
78. 14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (1661).
79. For a discussion of Perrys' Case and how it fits into the jurisprudence of the
corpus deliciti of murder, see Perkins supra note 35, at 174.





85. See id. at 175 (discussing the Boorn case which also involved a confession, an
execution and a "victim" turning up safe and sound).
86. On recent manifestations of the corpus delicti rule, including the
"trustworthiness doctrine," which admits uncorroborated confessions if they possess
circumstantial guaranties of reliability, see Virgin Islands v. Harris. 938 F.2d 401, 409-
10 (3d Cir. 1991).
87. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney 2002).
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3. Bodiless Murder Cases Based Entirely on Circumstantial Evidence
As already stated, bodiless murder cases based entirely on
circumstantial evidence are few and far between." In New York,
most bodiless murder cases have involved either some physical
evidence of foul play-such as bone fragments or blood" 9-a
confession or other inculpatory statements,"' or testimony from an
eyewitness either to the killing itself or to an incriminating violent
incident prior to or following the alleged killing." Considering the
difficulties, especially in our ever more interconnected and crowded
living environment, of 1) killing another human being in secret, 2)
disposing of the body in secret, 3) erasing, in secret, any trace of a
crime having been committed, and 4) keeping one's mouth shut, it is
no wonder that such cases are rare. 2 The kind of physical evidence
listed above-i.e. bone fragments or blood-is still circumstantial in
nature. The presentation at trial of an article of the defendant's
clothing stained with the alleged victim's blood or of the alleged
victim's bone fragments found in the defendant's house still only
provide an inference that the victim is dead. Given the strong and
often damning nature of such evidence, however, it is necessary for
the scope of this Comment to bracket and exclude such evidence from
the discussion as if it were direct evidence of a crime. 3
When a bodiless murder trial is based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, a certain set of risks and challenges arise. Yet these risks
and challenges are present in any criminal trial based entirely on
circumstantial evidence. As was the case with corpus delicti, murder,
especially bodiless murder, has served as a kind of lightning rod for
the concerns surrounding circumstantial evidence. In New York,
courts have reacted to these concerns by developing, and
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., People v. Seifert, 548 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (App. Div. 1989) (bone
fragments and blood "linked [defendant] to the scene [of the crime] by a continuous
chain of physical evidence").
90. See, e.g., People v. Zarif, 737 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340-41 (App. Div. 2002) (involving
a confession); People v. Applegate, 576 N.Y.S.2d 583, 584 (App. Div. 1991) (involving
an out of court admission); People v. Curro, 556 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365-66 (App. Div.
1990) (involving an admission).
91. See, e.g., People v. Konigsberg, 529 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197-98 (App. Div. 1988)
(involving eyewitness testimony regarding, inter alia, defendant digging a grave); see
also McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (involving
eyewitness testimony from an accomplice); The King v. Hindmarsh, 168 Eng. Rep.
387, 387-88 (1792) (where a crewmember testified to having seen Hindmarsh heave
the captain's body overboard).
92. On the impetus toward confession after Freud, see Brooks, supra note 72, at
113-43.
93. See, e.g., Siefert, 548 N.Y.S.2d 971 (providing an example of the damning role
such forensics can play in underscoring the reasonableness and moral underpinnings
of a guilty verdict for murder in absence of a body).
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subsequently dismantling, what has come to be known as the moral
certainty standard.
B. The Moral Certainty Standard in New York
New York courts have long recognized that a unique danger inheres
in criminal cases built entirely on circumstantial evidence.94 While not
discounting its weight,95 New York courts agree that circumstantial
evidence is often more probative than direct evidence.96 Where a
wholly circumstantial case is presented to a jury, however, it is the
very two step process of circumstantial evidence that produces the
aforementioned danger of impermissible inferences.
94. See People v. Sexton, 80 N.E. 396, 396-97 (N.Y. 1907) (requiring "so strong a
chain of evidence as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt every hypothesis save that
of [the defendant's] guilt," in a case built entirely on circumstantial evidence); People
v. Fitzgerald, 50 N.E. 846, 847 (N.Y. 1898) (applying the moral certainty standard to a
case built entirely on circumstantial evidence); People v. Johnson, 35 N.E. 604 (N.Y.
1893) (upholding a conviction for first degree murder where the evidence, although
wholly circumstantial in nature, allowed no other rational conclusion but guilt);
People v. Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137, 144 (1872) (applying the moral certainty standard in a
case before the Court of Appeals for the first time in New York); People v. Davis, 19
N.Y.S. 781 (Gen. Term 1892) (upholding a conviction based entirely on circumstantial
evidence because the judge adequately apprised jury of the extra deliberation
required in such a case); People v. Bodine, I Edm. Sel. Cas. 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845)
(applying the moral certainty standard in a case for arson and theft); see also People v.
Bretagna, 83 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1949) (allowing the denial of a circumstantial evidence
charge where direct evidence was present); CJI2d [NY] Circumstantial Evidence-
Entire Case (2001) (emphasizing the inferential leap inherent to circumstantial
evidence and outlining permissible and impermissible inferences); CJI 9.05
Circumstantial Evidence: Entire Case (1991) (outlining the moral certainty standard
to be applied in cases based solely on circumstantial evidence); cf. Holland v.
Hayman, 45 How. Pr. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) (applying the rule later taken up in the
CJI that all circumstantial facts proven have to be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence in a civil trial).
95. See People v. Neufeld, 58 N.E. 786, 788 (N.Y. 1900) (finding the trial court not
in error for announcing that circumstantial evidence was as good as direct evidence);
People ex rel. Voelpel v. Warden of City Prison, 75 N.Y.S. 1114, 1115 (Sup. Ct. 1902)
(declaring the proposition that circumstantial evidence is "a high form of evidence" to
be well founded); Davis, 19 N.Y.S. at 783 (stating that convictions can rest on either
circumstantial or direct evidence).
96. See People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 823 (N.Y. 1995) ("Circumstantial
evidence is not a disfavored form of proof and, in fact, may be stronger than direct
evidence .... "): People v. Cleague, 239 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1968) (stating that
"[tihe myth of innate superiority of direct testimonial evidence was exploded long
ago") (citation omitted); Neufeld, 58 N.E. at 788 (intimating that more incorrect
verdicts result from direct evidence than from circumstantial evidence); People v.
Harris, 33 N.E. 65, 67 (N.Y. 1893) ("[Clircumstantial evidence may be often more
satisfactory, and a safer form of evidence, for it must rest upon facts which, to prove
the truth of the charge made, must collectively tend to establish the guilt of the
accused."); People v. Gallo, 431 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012 (App. Div. 1980)
("Circumstantial evidence is frequently more reliable and stronger than direct proof
by eyewitness testimony.").
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1. The Two Step Process of Circumstantial Evidence and the
Development of the Moral Certainty Standard
One reason circumstantial evidence is admissible at all-other than
the fact that it can be both reliable and probative-is because courts
trust that juries are able to make certain necessary inferential leaps. 7
With direct evidence (eyewitness accounts, photographs or videotapes
of a crime in progress, corroborated confessions), a jury only must
decide on the credibility of the witness or media through which the
evidence is presented." By definition, direct evidence is proof-
usually testimonial in nature-which, if true, directly establishes a fact
at issue." With circumstantial evidence, a jury must make a leap of
logic and infer the existence of a fact at issue, connecting a
circumstantial fact to a directly incriminating fact." Courts trust
juries with this task because those very inferential leaps are part of
our everyday lives. If one leaves a child alone in a room with a
chocolate bar, only to return and find the chocolate missing and the
child strangely sated, one would be reasonable in inferring that the
child ate the chocolate bar. The danger in criminal trials based
entirely on circumstantial evidence, however, is that when a jury is
forced to make one such inference after another, the possibility that
an impermissible inference may slip in increases."2
For instance, in the scenario above, one could assume that the child
ate the chocolate, but no evidence would exist to support an inference
regarding whether she thought she was allowed to eat the bar, how
fast she ate it, which end of the bar she bit into first, whether she
enjoyed it or not (although this could most likely be assumed from
general experience) or whether she ate the chocolate bar in an effort
to peeve its owner. In relation to these facts, these impermissible
inferences may seem trivial, but in the context of a criminal trial, they
could mean the difference between guilt and innocence, inasmuch as
97. See People v. Fernandez, 35 N.Y. 48, 62-63 (1866) (outlining the common
sense aspect of circumstantial evidence); Louis R. Frumer et. al, 2-5 Bender's New
York Evidence-CPLR § 5.01 (2002). But see Cleague 239 N.E.2d at 619 (addressing
the danger posed by the "subjective inferential links" that can slip into a chain of
circumstantial evidence).
98. See Dennis D. Prater et. al, Evidence: The Objection Method 116 (2d ed.
2002) (underscoring that with direct evidence "[nmo inferences are required between
the proof itself and the ultimate fact to be established.").
99. See Black's Law Dictionary 577 (7th ed. 1999): William C. Donnino, New
York Court of Appeals on Criminal Law § 20:7 (2d ed. 2002): 31 A C.J.S. Evidence § 3
(2002).
100. This is outlined in the CJI2d INY] Circumstantial Evidence-Entire Case
(2001). See also Fisch, supra note 75, § 161.
101. See Fernandez, 35 N.Y. at 62-63 (presenting a colorful hypothetical which
demonstrates the often overwhelming probative value of circumstantial evidence).
102. See Cleague, 239 N.E.2d at 619.
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such inferences relate to important factors like intent, consciousness
of guilt, modus operandi and malice." 3
In response to this danger, New York courts have adopted the
resilient, yet elusive, moral certainty standard."4 According to that
standard, in cases built wholly on circumstantial evidence, a jury must
not only find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it must also find that
the government's case excludes "'to a moral certainty' every
hypothesis but guilt."" 5 This language appears in the Criminal Jury
Instructions ("CJI"), formerly promulgated by the New York State
Office of Court Administration."6  In 2001, the revised CJI2d
removed the words "moral certainty" from the appropriate
instruction-yet the moral certainty standard lives on in both spirit
and in name on all levels of the New York judiciary.""
In practice, the moral certainty standard consists of three steps, the
final one being the above-mentioned exclusion of any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence before a guilty verdict can obtain."" Before a
jury can get to this last step, however, it must first go through the
initial two steps, inquiring: 1) whether every inference drawn from the
web of circumstantial evidence is itself valid and based on direct
evidence (it is impermissible to draw an inference based on an
inference proved by circumstantial evidence), and 2) whether each
circumstantial fact is itself "consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence."" 9 If either of these inquiries fails, a guilty verdict cannot
obtain. Indeed, the first of these two inquiries comes into play
whenever a jury makes a decision based on circumstantial evidence,
even when direct evidence is present."" This inquiry is simply another
way of stating that circumstantial facts point to a limited set of
103. For the New York common law analog to Fed. R. Evid. 404 (b) (which allows
for the admissions of circumstantial evidence of prior bad acts to prove motive, intent,
knowledge, etc.), see People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
104. Cf People v. Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137, 144-45 (1872) (applying the moral
certainty standard in a case before the Court of Appeals for the first time in New
York).
105. See People v. Wachowicz, 239 N.E.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. 1968); see also People v.
Razezicz, 99 N.E. 557, 565 (N.Y. 1912); Bennett, 49 N.Y. at 145; People v. Harris, 33
N.E. 65. 67 (N.Y. 1893) (stating that where circumstantial evidence excludes every
hypothesis but guilt, there is "no substantial reason" why a jury should not convict).
106. CJi 9.05 Circumstantial Evidence: Entire Case (1991).
107. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 754 N.E.2d 1112 (N.Y. 2001) (mem.) (making
reference to the moral certainty charge in a memorandum decision); People v. Cabey,
649 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 467 (N.Y.
1995) (suggesting that moral certainty could indeed be more "certain" than "beyond a
reasonable doubt"); People v. Wong, 619 N.E.2d 377, 381 (N.Y. 1993); People v.
Daddona, 615 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (N.Y. 1993) (mem.): People v. Francis, 591 N.E.2d
I t68, 1169 (N.Y. 1992) (mem.); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189,1191 (N.Y. 1990)
(applying the appropriate standard of appellate review, yet equating it to the moral
certainty standard).
108. See supra note 105.
109. CJI 9.05 Circumstantial Evidence: Entire Case (1991).
110. See Frumer et al., supra note 97, § 5.03.
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permissible inferences.1 ' They do not, themselves, provide proof of
other facts, such as intent, consciousness of guilt, modus operandi, or
malice in our chocolate bar hypothetical.' 2  The second inquiry,
however, provides a level of deliberation not routinely present in
other criminal trials.
Where circumstantial evidence appears alongside direct evidence, it
may support a guilty verdict even though it may also be subject to a
reasonable explanation consistent with innocence." 3 In such a case, a
jury bases its decision not only on circumstantial inferences, but also
on the credibility of direct evidence; therefore, alternate explanations
for incriminating circumstantial facts go to the question of weight.
14
In the wholly circumstantial case, New York courts have been
reluctant to apply such a standard because of the likelihood that,
somewhere in the chain of inferences a jury must forge, an
impermissible link or an inference based on an inference will be
inserted.' '
2. The Procedural Nature of the Moral Certainty Standard
Indeed, the second, "consistent with guilt" inquiry outlined by the
CI reflects the overall structure of the moral certainty standard. The
only difference between the two is that the moral certainty standard
contemplates the case as a whole, requiring an acquittal when any
reasonable, global explanation which is inconsistent with guilt exists
for all of the circumstantial facts presented."' In contrast, the
"consistent with guilt" inquiry of the CJI attacks the problem of
impermissible inferences from a micro-level, scrutinizing each
circumstantial fact in relation to the inference or inferences that can
be reasonably drawn from it.
For this reason, the moral certainty standard is more of a
procedural safeguard than a substantive standard of proof.'" It
assures that juries proceed with all due lack of haste when faced with
an imbricated series of circumstantial inferences lacking direct
evidentiary support. In fact, the CJI makes clear that the moral
certainty standard does not increase the prosecution's burden of proof
11. See id.
112. See id.
113. This is evidenced by the inapplicability of the circumstantial evidence charge,
and subsequently the moral certainty standard in cases where direct and
circumstantial evidence are both present. See, e.g., People v. Guidice, 634 N.E.2d 951,
953 (N.Y. 1994).
114. See id.
115. See supra note 94.
116. See CJI 9.05 Circumstantial Evidence: Entire Case (1991).
117. Although courts in New York continue to refer to the moral certainty
standard as a standard of proof, the Court of Appeals made clear in People v. Barnes
that the moral certainty charge does not increase the burden of proof on prosecutors
beyond "beyond a reasonable doubt." See 406 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (N.Y. 1980).
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beyond the familiar, "reasonable doubt" standard."' The moral
certainty standard merely impresses upon jurors the special dangers
they face when forced to determine criminal culpability on
circumstantial evidence alone.
Some courts hold a lingering impression, despite active dissuasion
by the United States Supreme Court, that the moral certainty
standard is somehow a higher inquiry than the constitutional standard
of "beyond a reasonable doubt."" 9 This debate, however, only arises
in cases (circumstantial or otherwise) where the words "moral
certainty" or their equivalent are used to replace the phrase "beyond
a reasonable doubt" in a normal jury charge on burden of proof.2"
Such a practice was rejected by the Court in Victor v. Nebraska.2' In
New York, it is unclear whether one, uniform understanding of the
moral certainty standard, especially as a procedural safeguard rather
than a heightened standard of proof, exists.'22
Case law evinces the fact that the moral certainty safeguard is
procedural in nature.'23 Failure to give a jury the moral certainty
instruction-or, it would appear, its redacted version found in the
CJI2d-has been held to be reversible error, unless the evidence
taken as a whole weighs overwhelmingly in the prosecution's favor.'24
The moral certainty instruction, however, is only available in cases
based entirely on circumstantial evidence. 25  Where there is direct
evidence present, the instruction is not available. 26
Although universally called a standard of proof, the phrase "moral
certainty," or its equivalent as found in CJI2d, functions to impress
upon the jury the special burden placed on them in their
deliberations.127  In People v. Barnes, a defendant argued
unsuccessfully that the moral certainty standard raised the bar for the
prosecution in the presentation of its case. 2  The Court of Appeals
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
120. See id. at 39-40.
121. See 511 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1994) (stating that an emphasis on moral certainty rather
than evidentiary certainty in a jury charge could be ambiguous and misleading).
122. See supra note 117: see also People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (N.Y.
1990), People v. Borrero, 259 N.E.2d 902, 905 (N.Y. 1970) (noting the confusion
surrounding moral certainty). This kind of uncertainty surrounding the meaning of
moral certainty has led to a growing rejection of the term. See, e.g., People v.
Brigham, 599 P.2d 100, 106 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J. concurring); Barbara J. Shapiro, "To
a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38
Hastings L.J. 153, 153-54 (1986).
123. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 406 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (N.Y. 1980) (stressing the
procedural importance of proper deliberation in cases based entirely on
circumstantial evidence).
124. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 504 N.Y.S.2d 433 (App. Div. 1986) (mem.).
125. See People v. Daddona, 615 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (N.Y. 1993) (mem.).
126. See id.
127. 34 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 2418.
128. People v. Barnes, 406 N.E.2d at 1071.
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rejected this argument for Barnes specifically-since his conviction
was based on a mix of direct and circumstantial evidence-and for
circumstantial cases in general. Analogizing such cases to a puzzle
without all of its pieces, the court acknowledged that although the
jury's task was "complex," the moral certainty instruction provided it
with a guide as to how it could fit together the pieces it did have. 29
The standard does not create a higher standard of proof, but rather it
"draws attention to the rigorous function which must be undertaken
by the finder of fact when presented with a case of purely
circumstantial evidence."'3 "
3. The Erosion of Moral Certainty
Despite the value New York courts have found in alerting fact-
finders to the special pitfalls of cases built entirely on circumstantial
evidence, a recent trend has eroded the moral certainty safeguard.'31
As previously mentioned, courts have long found that when the
evidence weighs overwhelmingly in the prosecution's favor, failure to
give the moral certainty instruction and charge the jury with the
appropriate level of deliberativeness is not reversible error.1 32
Furthermore, in People v. Sanchez, the Court of Appeals held that the
words "moral certainty" were not indispensable to a circumstantial
evidence jury charge. 33 All that was necessary, according to the court,
was that it "appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can
fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence
excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." ' 34
Because of Sanchez and other similar holdings, the CJI for cases
built entirely upon circumstantial evidence was redacted to omit the
phrase "moral certainty."' 35 The new instruction reads,
129. Id. at 1074.
130. Id.
131. Compare CJI 9.05 Circumstantial Evidence: Entire Case (1991), with People
v. Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1984) (mem.), and CJI2d [NY] Circumstantial
Evidence-Entire Case (2001).
132. See People v. Brian, 644 N.E.2d 1345, 1346 (N.Y. 1994) (mem.) (holding that
the rejection of a circumstantial evidence charge by the trial court was harmless
error); People v. Sandven, 731 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (App. Div. 2001) (suggesting that
where evidence of guilt is overwhelming, failure to deliver a circumstantial evidence
charge can be harmless error); People v. Van Wallendael, 688 N.Y.2d 166, 167 (App.
Div. 1999) ("The court's failure to give the full circumstantial evidence charge
requested by the defendant was harmless error, given the overwhelming evidence of
the defendant's guilt.").
133. Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d at 1228-29.
134. Id. at 1229.
135. For cases in line with Sanchez, see People v. Gonzalez, 426 N.E.2d 474 (N.Y.
1981) and People v. Ford, 488 N.E.2d 458 (N.Y. 1985). The new criminal jury




Before you may draw an inference of guilt .... that inference
must be the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from
the facts, it must be consistent with the proven facts, and it must
flow naturally, reasonably, and logically from them.
Again, it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one
that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the
evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.' 36
From the wording of the CJI2d, it is clear that the standard of proof
in wholly circumstantial cases has not changed. 37 The jury must still
find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant is guilty, or else
acquit. 31 Indeed, although the quoted passage appears to charge the
jury with an extra level of inquiry, the steps it prescribes are one and
the same with those a jury must take in any criminal case in order to
conscientiously apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 31
Courts in New York (and elsewhere) have made this clear when they
have attempted to define the meaning of "beyond a reasonable
doubt."40
4. The Survival of Moral Certainty
If moral certainty is not an evidentiary standard on its own, 4' the
words "moral certainty" can confuse a jury42 and the words "moral
certainty" are not even necessary to properly charge a jury in a wholly
circumstantial case, 43 the question arises as to why New York courts
still rely on an, albeit watered-down, moral certainty safeguard. The
structure of the CJI2d charge and the dicta from Barnes identifying
the procedural nature of the safeguard provide the answer. 144
Courts rely on the moral certainty safeguard to impress upon fact-
finders (both juries and judges as intimated by Barnes) the dangers
inherent to wholly circumstantial cases. 45 The CJJ2d does not create
136. CJI2d [NY] Circumstantial Evidence-Entire Case (2001).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Indeed, in New York, as in many jurisdictions, courts have long used the
words "moral certainty" to help jurors grasp the meaning of "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See generally Shapiro, supra note 122.
140. See, e.g., People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Allah, 522
N.E.2d 1029 (N.Y. 1988) (mem.); People v. Lewis, 479 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1985)
(meri.).
141. See supra note 117.
142. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,6-9 (1994).
143. See People v. Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y. 1984).
144. Since the court found that Barnes' conviction was based on a mix of
circumstantial and direct evidence, its comments on the nature of the moral certainty
safeguard were secondary to the issue at hand and, therefore, dicta.
145. See People v. Barnes 406 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (N.Y. 1985) (referring to the
"complex and problematical reasoning process" required in wholly circumstantial
cases). On the pitfalls of circumstantial cases in general, see supra note 94.
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a new standard; it takes the time to articulate the same familiar
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" twice, albeit in differing
formulations. 46 The moral certainty safeguard ensures that a finder of
fact proceed slowly and, most of all deliberately, in piecing together
the set of inferences that may or may not point to guilt. 47 As the
Barnes court stated, cases built entirely on circumstantial evidence
resemble a puzzle that needs to be pieced together one piece at a
time.' If the finder of fact has every piece but one, it must acquit-
even if it knows the outlines of that missing piece, what it should look
like, and exactly where it fits in. To return a guilty verdict when one
piece is missing would be to draw an inference from an inference, a
practice forbidden in all cases, even those based, either wholly or in
part, on direct evidence.1
49
Circumstantial evidence requires a two step inquiry-questioning 1)
whether the evidence itself, evidence of a circumstantial fact, is
credible, and 2) whether the inference that can be drawn from that
fact is consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. One could
therefore expect that appellate review of such cases would exhibit a
similar structure.' By all outward appearances, that is not the case.' 5 '
If one delves deeper into the way in which the Appellate Division
reviews such cases, however, it becomes clear that the moral certainty
safeguard has a substantial effect on the way in which appellate courts
deal with wholly circumstantial cases.
a. Intermediate Appellate Review
In New York, an intermediate appellate court can review evidence
presented in criminal cases in two ways-for sufficiency'5 2 or for
weight.'53 When an intermediate appellate court reviews evidence for
its sufficiency, it rules on a matter of law and shows no deference to
the decision below.'54 When it reviews evidence for its weight, it
exercises the special fact-finding power given it under the New York
Criminal Procedure Law. 5' This power provides a check on the fact-
146. CJI2d INY] Circumstantial Evidence- Entire Case (2001).
147. See Barnes, 406 N.E.2d at 1074.
148. Id.
149. See Frumer et al., supra note 97, § 5.01.
150. Many appellate courts in New York have indeed applied a moral certainty
standard on appeal, only to be rebuked by the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., People v.
Rossey, 678 N.E.2d 473 (N.Y. 1997) (nieni.), People v. Norman, 650 N.E.2d 1303,
1309 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Cabey, 649 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (N.Y. 1995).
151. See supra note 150.
152. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(4)(b) (McKinney 2002).
153. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(5) (McKinney 2002). When the Appellate
Division reviews verdicts in this manner, it has been described as sitting as a
"thirteenth juror." See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,42 (1982).
154. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(4)(b) (McKinney 2002).
155. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(3)(b) (McKinney 2002): see also supra note
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finding power of the lower courts, but appellate courts apply it with
some degree of deference. 15 6
The inquiry into legal sufficiency results in significant deference to
findings of fact. 57 If the prosecution has presented at least some
evidence on every element of the crime that any reasonable juror
could have found probative of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then
the appellate court will find that the verdict in question was based on
legally sufficient evidence. 5' This level of review is analogous to the
requirements 1) that a Grand Jury indictment state a prima facie case
(often referred to as the prima facie case rule) and 2) that a trial judge
cannot let a guilty verdict stand if the prosecution fails to allege and
present evidence on every element of the crime charged.'59 Since its
scope is restricted to whether the prosecution has presented some
admissible evidence on every element upon which a reasonable juror
could have found the defendant guilty, the challenge of legally
insufficient evidence acts as a check on prosecutorial misconduct or
mistake.6 " In a sense, such a determination has little if anything to do
with the process of fact-finding, so long as there are no substantial
gaps in the evidentiary foundation upon which the fact-finder bases its
decision.' 6'
In New York, the inquiry into whether a verdict is against the
weight of the evidence is unique to the intermediate appellate
courts. 62  On questions of weight, however, such appellate courts
usually show wide deference to finders of fact on the trial level, since
those finders of fact are most able to assess the credibility of witnesses
and exhibits first hand.'63 All the appellate court has to go on is a
153.
156. See People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 675 (N.Y. 1987) ("Empowered with
this unique factual review, intermediate appellate courts have been careful not to
substitute themselves for the jury. Great deference is accorded to the fact-finder's
opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor.").
157. See People v. Williams, 644 N.E.2d 1367 (N.Y. 1994) ("A court reviewing legal
sufficiency of the trial evidence must instead determine whether any valid line of
reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion
reached by the fact finder on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the People.").
158. See Donnino, supra note 99, § 20:7.
159. The prima facie case rule is a product of the way the standard for "legally
sufficient evidence" (given in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 70.10(1)) is applied in N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 190.65 (outlining when a Grand Jury can hand down an
indictment). Its similarity to the test a judge must apply when presented with a
motion to dismiss was recognized by People v. Powell, 397 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (App.
Div. 1977).
160. Since a prosecutor is bound by the same laws of criminal procedure as are
Grand Juries, the presentation of a case which does not meet the prima facie case
must either issue from misconduct or mistake.
161. Indeed, these gaps would have to be so substantial as to negate an essential
element in the government's prima facie case. See generally supra note 160.
162. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(5) (McKinney 2002).
163. See supra note 156.
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cold, paper record, with none of the indicia of credibility, or lack
thereof, normally present in open court." '4
One limit to this deference is where a finder of fact bases its
determination of guilt on impermissible inferences.'65 A finder of fact
may have firsthand knowledge regarding credibility, but it has no
claim to be able to reason more soundly than an appellate panel.
166
Indeed, as is shown by the CJI2d instructions and in the reasoning
outlined in Barnes, the entire judiciary is concerned with the risk that
a finder of fact, especially in a circumstantial case, could allow
impermissible inferences of guilt to influence its decision.'67 In this
context, the only thing the fact-finder in a trial court can do better
than the appellate court is decide which permissible inferences to
draw, for it still may omit certain circumstantial facts from its
deliberations on the grounds that they were not credible. 6 '
The difficulty in placing a check on the reasoning of a finder of fact
centers on discerning which inferences were drawn because the
supporting evidence was credible and which inferences were drawn
impermissibly, i.e. based on no evidence, or based on another
inference. Because all it has before it is the cold record, an appellate
court cannot make such a determination. 9 It must assume that the
finder of fact was correct in its credibility determinations, unless the
evidence is so completely ambiguous that some impermissible
inference must have slipped in, or some lower standard of proof must
have been applied. 7
Ambiguity arises where the defense is able to submit a reasonable
explanation for the circumstantial facts which created the inference of
guilt in the first place.'7 ' Credibility no longer plays a role when such
an explanation is offered: such an explanation is not evidence per se,
unless the defendant testifies that his or her actions were in accord
with the explanation.'72 In such a case, the defendant's credibility
164. See People v. Branch, 634 N.E.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. 1994). But see People v.
Roman, 629 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (App. Div. 1995) (mem.) (finding a witness' testimony
"patently suspect" upon viewing the "cold record").
165. See generally Frumer et al., supra note 97.
166. Thus the issue of legal sufficiency is deemed a question of law and wholly
under the purview of the appellate court. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(4)(b)
(McKinney 2002).
167. See People v. Barnes, 406 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (N.Y. 1980); CJl2d [NY]
Circumstantial Evidence-Entire Case (2001).
168. See People v. Kennedy, 391 N.E.2d 288, 293 (N.Y. 1979) ("[I]t is the function
of the jury to sift through the conflicting evidence, direct or circumstantial, and to
determine whether the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."); see also Donnino, supra note 99, § 20:7.
169. See supra note 164.
170. See supra note 164.
171. Indeed, it does not matter where the reasonable explanation comes from. If a
juror finds that a reasonable explanation exists which is inconsistent with guilt, he or
she must acquit. See CJ2d [NY] Circumstantial Evidence-Entire Case (2001).
172. Once the defendant takes the stand, his or her credibility comes into question.
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becomes a question of weight and could lead the finder of fact to
dismiss the defendant's testimony entirely.13 Where the defense uses
each circumstantial fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt to paint a
logically coherent picture of the defendant's actions that is
inconsistent with guilt, however, credibility is not an issue.'74 If, for
instance, the defense-or any juror, for that matter-can connect
those dots which the prosecution uses to create an inference of guilt in
a way which reasonably creates an inference of innocence, a verdict of
guilty would be against the weight of the evidence and require
reversal by the Appellate Division. 175
b. De Facto Application of the Moral Certainty Safeguard on the
Intermediate Appellate Level
Hence, when an intermediate appellate court reviews such a verdict,
it must show no deference to the reasoning of the fact-finder below.7 6
If there is a single inferential gap (as in the puzzle analogy used above
and in Barnes), or an inference based upon conjecture, the court must
find that the verdict in question is invalid.'77 In this way, although not
explicitly stated as such, intermediate appellate courts apply the moral
certainty safeguard when reviewing guilty verdicts from circumstantial
cases to determine whether they are against the weight of the
evidence. In determining legal sufficiency, the appellate court looks
at 1) whether evidence was presented on every element of the crime
charged and 2) whether any reasonable juror, applying that evidence,
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In
contrast, when an intermediate appellate court makes a weight
determination, it inspects the soundness of the fact-finder's reasoning.
It checks to see if any impermissible leaps of logic were made or if the
fact-finder impermissibly disregarded a reasonable explanation of the
same evidence it used to determine guilt. 7
173. See Fisch, supra note 75, § 446.
174. When a defense attorney presents a rational explanation of the prosecution's
facts consistent with innocence, she is not presenting evidence as such, but rather
showing the kind of "logical gap" against which the court warned in People v.
Cleague, 239 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1968).
175. Since sufficiency is a question of law and deals only with whether credible
evidence was presented on every element of the crime(s) charged, any other
determination that the evidence presented did not support a guilty verdict would be
on the weight.
176. Deference extends to the fact-finder below only inasmuch as the fact-finder's
reasoning was based on permissible inferences.
177. See People v. Barnes, 406 N.E.2d 1071,1074 (N.Y. 1980).
178. One further test omitted above is whether the circumstantial facts presented
are all inconsistent with guilt. If a fact inconsistent with guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the global inference of guilt is invalid.
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In this way, although ushered into the wings after Sanchez, New
York courts continue to rely on the moral certainty safeguard.1 79 In
application, very few appellate courts pierce the veil of deference
shown to trial court fact-finders and overturn guilty verdicts on the
grounds that an impermissible inference was made or that the fact-
finder disregarded a reasonable explanation either proffered by the
defense or clearly visible from the facts themselves."" However, the
moral certainty safeguard continues to provide an important bulwark
at the trial level against one of the dangers unique to circumstantial
cases (including, of course, bodiless murder cases), a danger which has
helped shape the course of New York criminal jurisprudence from its
very beginnings."'
II. THE PENDULUM SWING IN NEW YORK BODILESS MURDER
JURISPRUDENCE- RULOFF, LIPSKY, AND BIERENBA UM
As outlined in Part I, Lord Hale established the long-standing
common-law rule regarding bodiless murder along with its Hindmarsh
exception-that a conviction for murder should not stand unless 1)
the body be found or direct evidence be available as to the death of
the victim or 2) circumstances are so extenuating (as was the case in
Hindmarsh) that death may be proven by circumstantial evidence
alone. 1 2 In the United States, for a time, legislatures truncated this
two-part rule so as to admit of no exception whatsoever, as evidenced
by the "no body-no conviction" statutes that remained on the books
in some states until 1974."3 As these statutes began to be repealed,
or, in many cases, simply fade away, courts began handing down
decisions more in line with Hale's old rule, Hindmarsh exception
intact. The pendulum that had initially swung away from Hale and
Hindmarsh had swung back. In New York, however, that pendulum
has recently overshot its mark, swinging indeed so far beyond Hale
and Hindmarsh as to disregard altogether their respective calls for
deliberateness of decision in bodiless murder cases. Three cases
punctuate the three points on this pendulum swing in New York:
Ruloff v. People,"4 People v. Lipsky,"5 and the recent decision from
the Appellate Division, People v. Bierenbaum." '
179. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
180. One example where a New York court did overturn a guilty verdict on just
such grounds was People v. Bearden, 49 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1943).
181. Cf Shapiro, supra note 122, at 193 (stressing that the words moral certainty
themselves and their extensive legal history play a vital role in the way juries
understand the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt").
182. See supra Part I.A.1,2.
183. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
184. 18 N.Y. 179 (1858).
185. 443 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1982).
186. 748 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2002).
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A. Strict Interpretation of the Hale/Hindmarsh Rule-Ruloff v. People
In England, courts initially interpreted the HalelHindmarsh rule
strictly,'8 7 thus perforce reading narrowly the Hindmarsh exception to
Hale's reluctance to convict in a case of bodiless murder.188 Indeed,
Hindmarsh became a unique exception, rather than one from which
others could be extrapolated. 89 In the United States, however, courts
were becoming more and more open to the idea that circumstantial
evidence could be used to prove all elements of a crime, including
corpus delicti9  In relation to murder in New York, this trend came
to an end in the case of Ruloff v. People,9' which established the "no
body-no conviction" rule that would later become part of the state's
penal code.'92
The openness to proving corpus delicti with circumstantial evidence
in the United States depended heavily on the fact that 1) cases built
entirely on circumstantial evidence were still subject to the common
law moral certainty safeguard and 2) modern courts afforded
defendants with the opportunity to call witnesses and present
significant evidence in their defense, perhaps lessening the need for
such strict protection as the English interpretation of Lord Hale's rule
provided.'93 The case United States v. Gibert is a prime example of this
openness. 94
Gibert was a piracy case.'95 In his decision, however, Justice Joseph
Story, riding circuit in Massachusetts, spent much of his time
discussing the use of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction
for murder. 6 He did this, ostensibly, because of the way in which
187. For a digest of English reception of the Hale/Hindmarsh rule, see Ruloff, 18
N.Y. at 187-91. But see 2 Sir William Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and
Misdemeanors (photo. reprint 1979) (1865) (stating that Lord Hale's "rule, it seems,
must be taken with some qualifications; and circumstances may be sufficiently strong
to show the fact of the murder, though the body has never been found").
188. See Ruloff, 18 N.Y. at 187-91.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., id. at 191-92 (presenting a discussion of early American cases
evincing an openness to circumstantial evidence as the basis for corpus delicti); see
also, 3 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 30 (15th ed. 1892)
(containing a verbatim passage from the 1858 edition); William Wills, An Essay on
the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence 200-16 (Alfred Wills ed., Fred B. Rothman
& Co. 1981) (1,860); id. at 207-08 ("[T]o require the discovery of the body in all cases
would be unreasonable and lead to absurdity and injustice, and it is indeed frequently
rendered impossible by the act of the offender himself.").
191. 18 N.Y. 179 (1858).
192. For a history of the "no body-no conviction" rule in the various New York
Penal Laws, see People v. Lipsky, 443 N.E.2d 925, 930 (N.Y. 1982).
193. On the moral certainty safeguard in relation to a case for murder, see People
v. Bodine, I Edm. Sel. Cas. 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845). For a brief discussion of the
differences between the court system in Lord Hale's time and that present in New
York in 1858, see Ruloff, 18 N.Y. at 186.
194. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204).
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 1290.
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piracy and murder on the high seas functioned, at the time, as part and
parcel of the same offense. 9 7 The Crimes Act of 1790 prohibited both
crimes and declared that they would be punishable by death.'9 ' Since
piracy was a capital offense, courts felt the need to proceed as
deliberately as possible where a significant part, if not the entirety, of
the prosecution's case depended on circumstantial evidence.
In regard to the danger of relying on circumstantial evidence in
capital cases, Story wrote that previous cases on the subject
established that there could be no global ban on the prosecution of
murder without a body. Using the example of murder on the high
seas, he reasoned that in such cases, "the body is rarely if ever found;
and a more complete encouragement and protection for the worst
offences of this sort could not be invented, than a rule of this
strictness. It would amount to a universal condonation of all murders
committed on the high seas."' 99 In his opinion, Story evinced the then
growing strength of an American version of the Hindmarsh argument,
which postulated that 1) circumstantial evidence can be just as
probative and reliable, if not more so, than direct evidence and 2)
allowing a murderer to escape prosecution because he or she was
especially good at disposing of the victim's body would be an
unacceptable miscarriage of justice. In New York, at least, this
trend was short-lived, as evinced by the landmark case, Ruloff v.
People.2 1
Ruloff involved a murder in which no body had been found and
where the prosecution had made no effort at trial to produce direct
evidence of the death of the victim, or of an act, committed by the
defendant, which would have been sufficiently violent to cause the
death of the victim. 2 2 The defendant had been charged with the
murder of his infant daughter when she and his wife went missing
without a trace. 203 The mother and child were last seen alive on the
evening of January 24, 1845, by a neighbor.214 The next day, Ruloff
borrowed a wagon from another neighbor and enlisted that neighbor's
help in loading into it a heavy box .2 0' Ruloff drove off with the wagon
and box, returning the next day with both.21 ' He gave several false
exculpatory stories as to the whereabouts of his wife and child.2 7 In
197. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. IX § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (An Act for the Punishment of
certain Crimes against the United States); see also Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Yo
Heave Ho!": Updating America's Piracy Laws, 21 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 151, 153-54 (1990).
198. 1 Stat. 112.
199. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1290.
200. See supra note 190.
201. 18 N.Y. 179 (1858)
202. Id.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 180-81.
207. Id. at 181.
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his home, he had articles, such as a ring, that others had seen in the
possession of his wife on the 24th.21s He later fled to Chicago under
an assumed name, and told others there that his wife and child had
died on the Illinois River some six weeks before.19 In Chicago,
authorities gained possession of a box containing books, papers, and
clothing that had belonged to Mrs. Ruloff, as well as what appeared to
be a lock of her hair attached to a note, upon which the words "Oh,
that dreadful hour!" were written.
21
'
Ruloff moved at the opening of the trial to have the case dismissed
for lack of corpus delicti.21' The judge declined to rule on the question
until the prosecution had presented its case, at which time Ruloff
renewed the motion.21 2 Justice Mason then conducted a detailed
analysis of the issue, citing William Wills for the proposition that a
victim's death "may be [legally] inferred from such strong and
unequivocal circumstances [of presumption] as render it morally
certain, and leave no ground for reasonable doubt. ' 213 Justice Mason
then left to the jury the question of whether the prosecution had
proven corpus delicti of the crime to a moral certainty, whereupon the
jury convicted Ruloff.214
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered Mason's reasoning and
rejected it.21" Relying heavily on early English sources, and rejecting
the trend established in Gibert and elsewhere, Judge Johnson found
no compelling argument that the Hindmarsh exception to Lord Hale's
rule should be extended.21 Strangely enough, both the ruling below
by Justice Mason and the decision that overturned it in the Court of
Appeals stand for the proposition that Lord Hale's rule, complete
with its Hindmarsh exception, was good law. 2 7 Nevertheless the rule
left in place after Ruloff, which read the Hindmarsh exception
narrowly, is entirely different from the rule set out in Gibert and,




211. Id. at 180.
212. Id. at 180-81.
213. Id. at 183. The text quoted in Ru/off does not include the words "legally" and
"of presumption" present in the 1860 edition. See Wills, supra note 190, at 208.
214. Ru/off, 18 N.Y. at 183-84.
215. Id. at 184-99.
216. Id. at 188-91, 193.
217. Compare id. at 181-83 (presenting a near identical paraphrase of the facts of
Hindmarsh, as well as quoting Wills, who relies on Hindmarsh for his conclusions),
with id. at 179 (stating in the syllabus that Lord Hale's rule was affirmed), and id. at
199 (stating that "no judicial authority warrant[s] the departure" from Lord Hale's
rule).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1290 (C.C. Mass. 1834) (No
15,204); People v. Bodine, I Edm. Sel. Cas. 36, 43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (stating that it
was a "strange delusion" on the part of a juror who stated he would not convict for
murder on circumstantial evidence alone).
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other jurisdictions, this restrictive reading of the Hindmarsh exception
was later codified into the New York Penal Laws of 1882 and 1909.
The New York version of the "no body-no conviction" rule faded
away in 1965 when the assembly failed to include it in its revision of
the Penal Law. The first case to come before the Court of Appeals
after the 1965 de facto rescission of the Ruloff rule was People v.
Lipsky in 1982.219
B. The Swing Back Toward Gibert-People v. Lipsky
Although technically a bodiless murder case, Lipsky also involved
other, direct evidence of a crime, namely a confession by the
defendant to a social worker and a cryptic admission in the form of a
poem.22 1 In relation to Ruloff, however, Lipsky stands for the
proposition that in New York, the corpus delicti of murder may be
proven by circumstantial evidence alone.22 ' The question of corpus
delicti in relation to other, direct evidence of a crime arose in Lipsky
because of the corpus delicti rule.222 Since Lipsky had confessed to his
crime, the common law corpus delicti rule (codified in New York
Criminal Procedure Law § 60.50) required that his confession be
corroborated before it be admitted against him. 22
3
In Lipsky, the defendant, an accounting student in Rochester, was
charged with killing and disposing of the body of part-time prostitute,
Ms. Mary Robinson.224 Ms. Robinson went missing on the night of
June 9, 1976, and was never heard from again.225 Soon thereafter,
Lipsky, who seemed "upset and emotionally overwrought," left town
for Arizona in order to work at his parents' motel.226 While he
prepared for his departure, several items belonging to Mary Robinson
were found in Lipsky's apartment, but no arrest was made.227 By 1978,
Lipsky was in Provo, Utah, where he had married.228 There, during a
219. 443 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1982). Indeed, Lipsky may have been a case where the
victim's body was never found, but it did, like Ruloff in some respects, involve a
confession to a social worker and a cryptic admission in the form of a poem. Note
that confessions or admissions are usually considered direct evidence of a crime. See,
e.g., Fisch, supra note 75, § 853. In New York, if they take the form of false
exculpatory stories, however, they are usually found insufficient to prove guilt if no
other direct evidence can corroborate the corpus delicti. See, e.g., People v. Moses,
472 N.E.2d 4, 9 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that consciousness-of-guilt evidence, even in the
form of a false alibi, could not even satisfy the relatively low standard for accomplice
corroboration); see also Lipsky, 443 N.E.2d at 928 (quoting the poem penned by
Lipsky and used against him at trial).
220. See Lipsky, 443 N.E.2d at 928-29.
221. Id. at 929-30.
222. See supra Part I.A.2.
223. Lipsky, 443 N.E.2d at 926.
224. Id. at 927-28.
225. Id. at 927.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 927-28.
228. Id. at 928.
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psychological evaluation predicated on an arrest for aggravated
assault, Lipsky confessed to a psychiatric social worker that he had
killed Ms. Robinson.2 29 Authorities in Rochester were notified and
Lipsky was extradited back to New York.23° At trial, the prosecution
confronted him not only with his confession to the social worker, but
also with a cryptic poem, penned by Lipsky, which tended to admit
guilt.21'
Because of the need for corroboration under the corpus delicti rule
and New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.50, the Lipsky court
began with an analysis of Ruloff.232 The court quickly distinguished
the requirement that corpus delicti be proved in every criminal case
from the aforementioned corpus delicti rule. The court also explained
that where a confession is present and corroborated, no other indicia
of guilt is required.233 In a preliminary section which is essentially
dicta, it elaborated on the state of the corpus delicti requirement after
the lapse of the Ruloff rule in 1965.234
The court derided the Ruloff rule as "a door of escape to that brutal
courage which can mangle and burn the lifeless body. ' 235 The court
also noted the way in which the rule "has been widely criticized as one
which rewards the professional or meticulous killer., 236 Because of
the Ruloff rule's conspicuous absence in the Penal Law revision of
1965, and because similar rules remained on the books in "but a small
minority of jurisdictions," the court found the question of whether the
Ruloff rule was still good law to be axiomatic.237 It stated that "the
Ruloff rule is so clearly out of harmony with the general rule that the
corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence that we
have no hesitancy in overruling it."23
Thus the dicta in Lipsky marks a pendulum swing back to the more
expansive reading of the HalelHindmarsh rule as evinced in cases
such as Gibert, and in commentators such as Wills, Greenleaf, Russel




232. Id. at 929.
233. Id. at 930.
234. Id. at 929-30.
235. Id. at 930 (quoting People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 110, 112 (1888)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The appropriate section of the first codification of the Ruloff rule read,
"No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter unless the death of the
person alleged to have been killed and the fact of killing by the defendant, as alleged,
are each established as independent facts; the former by direct proof and the latter
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 930 n.2 (quoting L. 1882, c. 384, § 181).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1290 (C.C. Mass. 1834) (No
15,204); Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179, 194-95 (1858) (containing an overview of
Starkie's view on bodiless murder); Greenleaf, supra note 190; Russell, supra note
187; Wills, supra note 190.
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however, bounded by the moral certainty safeguard, which itself was
still indispensable to cases built entirely on circumstantial evidence, at
least until the ruling of People v. Sanchez.24 Despite this expansion in
Lipsky, trials for murder in absence of a body or any other direct
evidence of a crime remained few.24' Indeed, until very recently there
were no cases on record in which there was no body, no direct
evidence and no other more damning circumstantial evidence, such as
blood or bone fragments. 24 2  In the recent decision of People v.
Bierenbaum,243 the Appellate Division has cast aside a long tradition
of caution in reviewing such cases and deemed it appropriate to
extend Lipsky and the HalelHindmarsh rule beyond all traditional
bounds.
C. Heaving the Hale/Hindmarsh Rule Overboard- People v.
Bierenbaum
In the highly publicized case of People v. Bierenbaurm, a plastic
surgeon, Dr. Robert Bierenbaum, was convicted of killing his wife,
dismembering her body and then transporting it from their Manhattan
apartment to a private airfield in New Jersey.244 The jury found that
Bierenbaum then loaded the corpse into a small, single engine plane,
flew out over the Atlantic Ocean and dumped the body into the water
without a trace.245
Bierenbaum and his wife, Mrs. Gall Katz Bierenbaum, had a
troubled marriage.2 4' They quarreled often, and in 1983, a year after
they were married, the doctor allegedly attacked his wife, choking her
until she was unconscious. 24 By all accounts, Gail Katz Bierenbaum
240. 463 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1984). Compare CJI 9.05 Circumstantial Evidence:
Entire Case (1991), with CJI2d INY] Circumstantial Evidence-Entire Case (2001),
and Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d at 1229 (stating that the words "moral certainty" were no
longer indispensable to a circumstantial evidence charge).
241. For bodiless murder cases in which either other physical evidence (such as
blood or bone fragments). confessions or admissions played a role since Lipsky, see
People v. Zarif. 737 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (App. Div. 2002) (involving a confession):
People v. Curro, 556 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1990) (involving an admission). People
v. Siefert, 548 N.Y.S.2d 971, 973 (App. Div. 1989) (involving blood, fiber and bone-
fragment evidence): People v. Gurney. 493 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985)
(involving a confession). Indeed, Siefert seems to be the only case which fits into the
paradigm of this Comment, i.e., a bodiless murder case with no direct evidence,
including confessions or admissions. In Siefert, however, the overwhelmingly
damning nature of the physical evidence present renders the case more akin to other
direct evidence cases. See 548 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77.
242. See, e.g.. Siefert, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77.
243. 748 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2002).
244. Id. at 567.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 575 (describing the Biecrnbaum's marriage as "an emotional
battleground").
247. Id. at 568.
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was looking for a way out of the relationship. 245  She had begun
apartment hunting and had told her friends that she was ready to
leave her husband.249 If he did not agree to the divorce, she had
planned to use a Tarasoff letter 251 she had received from
Bierenbaum's psychotherapist, which said he thought Bierenbaum
posed an imminent threat to her safety because of threats and other
statements made in therapy.51 On July 7, 1985, the very day she had
planned to confront her husband, Mrs. Bierenbaum went missing and
252was never seen or heard from again.- Police quickly centered their
investigation on Bierenbaum, questioning him and searching his
apartment, but they were unable to come up with enough evidence to
support an indictment. 3  Fifteen years later, by which time
Bierenbaum had remarried and set up a plastic surgery practice in
North Dakota, authorities arrested the doctor and charged him with
murder. 4
At trial, Bierenbaum asserted that the circumstantial evidence used
against him was insufficient to support a charge of murder.255 From
the beginning he had offered several exculpatory stories, such as how
his wife had left the apartment that day to go sunbathing in Central
Park, how she had a drug habit and had probably run off with her
drug-dealer friends, or how she had been unfaithful to him and that
she had probably left him for her lover.256 Eventually, for reasons not
apparent from the decision, Bierenbaum conceded that his wife died
on the day she was last seen, July 7, 1985.257 He still contended,
however, that given the complete lack of physical evidence that a
crime had occurred (including the fact that police had neither
recovered his wife's body nor found any trace of foul play in his
248. Id. at 575.
249. Id.
250. As a general rule, ever since Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), psychotherapists owe a duty of care to third parties who
might be harmed by the violent actions of their patients when the therapist knows the
patient poses a serious threat of such violence and he or she finds the threat credible.
See id. at 340. Therapists can fulfill this duty of care by issuing a communication
warning the third party of the threat. See id. As a result, such communications are
often called Tarasoff letters.
251. Bierenbaurn, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (indicating that she planned to disclose an
alleged Medicare fraud scheme that implicated both her husband and her father in-
law).
252. Id. at 568.
253. Id. at 569-71.
254. Katherine E. Finkelstein, Surgeon Convicted of Murdering Wife, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 25, 2000, at B3.
255. Bierenbaum also presented an eyewitness whose testimony contradicted the
rather tight timeline relied upon by the prosecution. See Riccardi, supra note 12.
Regarding the eyewitness testimony, see Bierenbauni, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
256. Other alternate stories included a quip that she was probably on a shopping
spree at Bloomingdale's. See Bierenbaurn, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
257. Id. at 567.
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apartment), a jury would be legally unable to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In order to bridge the gap of physical evidence in its case, the
prosecution brought in expert testimony which explained to the jury
how Bierenbaum had been able to cover his tracks.25' They also
presented a flight log, kept by Bierenbaum, an amateur pilot, that
indicated he had rented a small, single-engine plane from an airfield in
New Jersey on the afternoon of July 7, 1985, and took off without
logging a flight plan.211 He landed shortly thereafter and eventually
returned home 2 1 According to the prosecution, in the short time
between the point at which Gail Katz Bierenbaum was last seen alive
and the point at which the doctor arrived at the New Jersey airfield,
Bierenbaum had killed her, stuffed her small-framed body (either
dismembered or intact) into a duffel bag and drove approximately
twenty-five miles to get the plane. Once at the airfield, Bierenbaum
loaded his wife's body onto the plane, took off toward the Atlantic
Ocean, dumped her body in the ocean once he was relatively far out,
and then returned.262 In support of these allegations, the prosecution
presented videotaped reenactment evidence, showing how a man of
Bierenbaum's build could load a 110-pound body into a plane and
successfully maintain control while flying eighty-five miles out over
the sea and dumping the body overboard.6 3
On appeal, Bierenbaum raised several evidentiary challenges,
including 1) that the evidence presented against him was legally
insufficient 2) that the guilty verdict reached by the jury was against
the weight of the evidence and 3) that character evidence of the prior
attack on his wife was impermissibly used as propensity evidence.2 4
For the purposes of this discussion and the appellate decision, the first
of these challenges is of the least importance. As outlined in Part I.B
of this Comment, the standard for legal sufficiency is low and rarely
left unmet. On appeal, a court must find that there was no "'valid line
of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational
person to the conclusion [of guilt] on the basis of the evidence at trial,
258. Note that Bierenbaum's lawyers did not focus on the fact that a body had not
been produced. That was the strategy unsuccessfully relied upon by the defense in
the Kimes trial. See Riccardi, supra note 12.
259. Bierenbaum, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
260. Id. at 572-73.
261. The flight lasted just under two hours. After landing, Bierenbaum went to his
sister's home in Montclair, New Jersey, to celebrate his nephew's birthday. Id. at 568-
69.
262. See, e.g., id. at 588 (presenting a description of the videotape used by the
prosecution to prove their theory of how Bierenbaum disposed of his wife's body).
263. Id. On the prejudicial nature of the demonstrative evidence in the
Bierenbaum trial, see Abraham Abramovsky, Part 2: No Body, Weapons, Forensics:
Have Courts Gone Too Far?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8,2003, at 3.
264. Bierenbaum, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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viewed in the light most favorable to the People.' 26 5  This is a
permissive standard and amounts to a restatement of the prima facie
case rule.266
It was in its analysis of weight and the admissibility of character
evidence that the court in Bierenbaum made its most radical moves.
In relation to weight, the court manufactured a new standard for the
sufficiency of both consciousness-of-guilt evidence and evidence of
motive and opportunity. Previously in New York, both of these
categories had been insufficient on their own, or even in concert, to
support a finding of guilt.6 7
1. The Bierenbaum Weight Analysis
As Professor Abraham Abramovsky suggested in an article on the
Bierenbaum decision, the court added up 0 + 0 and ended up with 1,
meaning it took two previously insufficient forms of evidence and
found them sufficient in concert.26 In his opinion, Justice Marlow of
the Appellate Division, First Department, placed the most weight on
the consciousness-of-guilt evidence presented against Bierenbaum." 9
Relying on People v. Cintron,27" the court found that the
overabundance of other circumstantial evidence against Bierenbaum
allowed it to ascribe at least a "moderate degree of probative force"
to the consciousness-of-guilt evidence.27'
To this "moderate degree of probative force," Justice Marlow
added the tenuous elements of motive and opportunity to find the
verdict below not to be against the weight of the evidence."' It is true
that the prosecution can always use motive and opportunity in its case
265. Id. at 579 (quoting People v. Williams, 644 N.E.2d 1367 (N.Y. 1994)).
266. See supra Part L.B (defining the prima facie case rule, which requires the
prosecution to present at least some admissible evidence on every element of the
crime charged in order for a guilty verdict to properly obtain).
267. See People v. Bennett, 593 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1992) ("Consciousness of
guilt evidence has consistently been viewed as weak because the connection between
the conduct and a guilty mind often is tenuous. Even innocent persons, fearing
wrongful conviction, may flee or lie to extricate themselves from situations that look
damning." (citations omitted)), People v. Moses, 472 N.E.2d 4, 5 (N.Y. 1984) (noting
that consciousness-of-guilt evidence, even in the form of a false alibi, was insufficient
to satisfy the much lower standard for accomplice corroboration). See generally
Abraham Abramovsky, Part 1: No Body, Weapon or Forensics: Have Courts Gone
Too Far?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29, 2002, at 3.
268. See Abramovsky, supra note 267.
269. 748 N.Y.S.2d at 573-80. This included, inter alia, a false alibi for the period
between 4:30 and 6:30 p.m. on July 7, 1985 (when Bierenbaum was flying his rented
Cessna), false exculpatory stories (including the quip that his wife was probably on a
Bloomingdale's shopping spree), and Bierenbaum's dating habits soon after his wife's
disappearance. Id.
270. 740 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2000).
271. Bierenbaum, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 579 (quoting People v. Benzinger, 324 N.E.2d
334, 337 (N.Y. 1974)).
272. Id. at 579.
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in chief and they can be legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict
where a criminal act, i.e., the corpus delicti of the crime charged, has
already been established.27 Conversely, if the prosecution has not
established such an act, as in the case where a person confesses to a
crime that has not yet been discovered, motive and opportunity alone
cannot supply the missing corpus delicti.274
In its review of the case made against Bierenbaum, the Appellate
Division elided its Cintron analysis with its analysis of corpus delicti,
i.e., it found reasons why the probative force of both consciousness-of-
guilt evidence and motive and opportunity should be increased before
the corpus delicti of the crime had been established. While
Bierenbaum conceded to the occurrence of his wife's death on July 7,
1985, the corpus delicti of murder consists of not only the death of the
victim, but the intentional criminal agency of another person in
causing that death.
Without independent evidence tending to prove that the murder
occurred in such a way that implicates the defendant, no Cintron
fortification of consciousness-of-guilt evidence, with or without the
addition of motive and opportunity, should occur. In Bierenbaum, the
prosecution bridged this evidentiary gap with its expert testimony and
reenactment evidence. 275 These devices only served to strengthen the
impermissible inference that Bierenbaum's inconsistent statements,
coupled with his motive and opportunity, established the fact that the
crime itself was perpetrated, not just that it was perpetrated by
Bierenbaum. This kind of bootstrapping has created an evidentiary
loophole that flies in the face of the caution urged not only by the
HalelHindmarsh rule and its application in Lipsky, but also by the
long history of the moral certainty safeguard in New York.27 '
2. The Bierenbaum Analysis of Character Evidence
The loophole opened by the Bierenbaurm weight analysis is only
widened when considered in conjunction with the Appellate
Division's analysis of the admissibility of character evidence.277 The
Court of Appeals has long found character evidence inadmissible
when offered by the prosecution to show action in conformity
therewith.27  The danger that a jury may convict a defendant based
upon his or her past acts, and not the acts in question, has led the
Court to construct a near complete bar to such evidence, which can
273. See generally LaFave, supra note 69, § 3.6.
274. See, e.g., People v. Moses, 472 N.E.2d 4, 9 (N.Y. 1984).
275. Bierenbaurn, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
276. See, e.g., supra Parts IA, l.B, 1IB.
277. See Bierenbaum, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 585-88.
278. See, e.g., People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) ("Inflexibly the
law has set its face against the endeavor to fasten guilt upon [a defendantI by proof of
character or experience predisposing to an act of crime.").
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often be highly probative. As an exception to the bar, character
evidence can be admitted to prove motive, identity or intent.279
In Bierenbaum, accounts of the doctor's 1983 choking attack on his
wife were admitted, ostensibly, to prove 1) that he could have
intentionally done physical harm to his wife and 2) that he (and
arguably no one else) had a propensity for directing his anger at his
wife. Although these inferences are permissible and, in cases of
domestic violence, of special importance to the prosecution, they still
do not clear the corpus delicti hurdle. As noted above, considering
the importance of evidence of motive (including intent) and
opportunity (which is the basic element of identity) without first
establishing the body of the crime puts the cart before the horse and
bootstraps a previously insufficient body of evidence into the realm of
legal sufficiency. As Part III of this Comment explores, this analysis
used by the Appellate Division in Bierenbaum not only swings the
pendulum of bodiless murder jurisprudence in New York beyond its
resting point at Lipsky, it also holds significant import for other cases
in which the body of the crime is difficult to establish.
III. CLOSING THE BIERENBAUM LOOPHOLE
This part explores in detail the dangers created by the Bierenbaum
decision and suggests ways in which the Court of Appeals can remedy
them. It also demonstrates that New York law already provides for a
stable middle ground for bodiless murder jurisprudence-one which
would avoid the evidentiary loopholes opened by Bierenbaum and the
deleterious effect they could have on the public trust in law
enforcement.
A. The Aftereffects of Bierenbaum
In relation to murder, the bootstrapping loophole opened by
Bierenbaum creates several unique dangers: 1) that the number of
bodiless murder cases prosecuted in New York will skyrocket, 2) that
in cases where past acts of domestic violence are involved, there will
be a presumption of guilt based on character evidence, 3) that
consciousness-of-guilt evidence coupled with evidence of motive and
opportunity will become a kind of "smoking gun" in bodiless murder
cases and 4) that trust in law enforcement will decline because the
wider scope of its reach will make its actions appear arbitrary. In
relation to all cases in which corpus delicti is in question, the
Bierenbaum decision creates the danger that the exception to the bar
on the use of character evidence by the prosecution in its case in chief
will swallow the rule, allowing fact-finders to convict on the basis of
prior bad acts. In response to these dangers, the Court of Appeals
279. See Fisch, supra note 75, §§ 210-11.
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should seek to limit the effects of Bierenbaum, and return to the
protections offered by the HalelHindmarsh rule and the moral
certainty safeguard in cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
1. The Effect of Bierenbaurm on Bodiless Murder Cases
The difficulty of limiting the prosecution of any bodiless murder
case arises from the facts that 1) the defendants involved are often
unsavory and, at least from appearances, almost surely guilty, and 2)
the HalelHindmarsh rule appears insignificant. After all, as history
has shown us, true bodiless murder cases are few and far between, a
scarcity increased by the overcrowded, over-surveilled and overly
confession-oriented society in which we now live. It can therefore be
unclear why we should be especially careful with these unsavory
defendants of which the Court of Appeals was so wary in Lipsky.28 0°
Bierenbaun provides the answer to this question when it borrows
from other types of cases, i.e., using the character evidence exception
from domestic violence jurisprudence, to construct its decision.2" ' As
this Comment has attempted to make clear, cases of bodiless murder
are less of an important area of the law in and of themselves as they
are a kind of lightning rod to which other important issues, such as
corpus delicti and the danger in cases built entirely on circumstantial
evidence, are inextricably drawn.25 2 As such, the Bierenbaum decision
will have repercussions not only in the arena of bodiless murder
jurisprudence, but also in other, less obvious areas.
In relation to bodiless murder, the first such repercussion is the fact
that the very number of truly bodiless murder cases, which has,
understandably, remained low ever since the development of the
HalelHindmarsh doctrine, will be likely to increase dramatically.
Even though the sample is small, recent experience in New York is
telling. Argued by many to be the first of their kind in New York, the
Kimes and Bierenbaum prosecutions began within a year of each
other. Although the Kimes prosecution followed rather promptly on
the heels of the disappearance and suspected murder of Irene
Silverman, the Bierenbaum action re-opened an investigation that had
laid dormant for fifteen years. In August of 2002, another murder
prosecution began in absence of a body-this time regarding the
disappearance of Quinnipiac Law School student Samiya Haqiqi, who
went missing on November 12, 1999, and has not been heard from
since. Based on the testimony of an informant, her ex-boyfriend and
280. That is, the sort that possess "[the] brutal courage [to] mangle and burn ja]
lifeless body." People v. Lipsky, 443 N.E.2d 925, 930 (N.Y. 1982) (quoting People v.
Palmer, 16 N.E. 529, 530 (N.Y. 1888)).
281. See supra Part II.C.2.
282. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.
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his brother were charged with killing Ms. Haqiqi and disposing of her
body.283
Given the new breadth of the state's prosecutorial reach and the
evidence of recent experience, it is reasonable to assume that what
was once rarely, if ever, prosecuted will become more commonplace.
This, in itself, is not a negative development. Indeed, if the increased
prosecution for murder in absence of a body lands more actual killers
behind bars, such a development would be a clear example of an
absolute social good. Because of their complete reliance upon
circumstantial evidence, however, bodiless murder cases bring with
them a level of speculation and uncertainty that can make a rise in the
prosecution for murder in absence of a body (or any other direct
evidence of a crime) a troubling event.
For instance, in a missing persons case in which there has been a
history of domestic violence, there will now be a presumption of guilt
that will be difficult to overcome. Even more troubling is the fact that
a party with a history of domestic violence can offer little to rebut
such a presumption. The appalling nature of domestic violence as
well as the tendency toward recidivism make this presumption of guilt,
however impermissible, all the more reasonable."5 4 In such a case, not
even an alibi will help: the effectiveness of an alibi turns on its
credibility, whereas circumstantial evidence of motive, intent or
identity turns only on its reasonableness. In addition, alibis are only
useful when the exact date and time of an alleged offense is known.
As other cases, especially those involving child abuse, have shown,
time and date of an alleged offense need not be averred specifically
where time and date of an offense are by nature unclear.2 5 Therefore,
since the prosecution must always speculate on time of death in a
bodiless murder case, it can choose to cast its net sufficiently wide so
283. Note that this case, involving corroboration of alleged admissions, involves the
corpus delicti rule and is not, as this Comment has defined them, a bodiless murder
case built entirely on circumstantial evidence. See Sean Gardiner, Following the Trail:
Boyfriend Charged in Student's Slaying, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 3, 2002, at A3.
284. On the tendency toward recidivism in abusive households, see Mary Lystad et
al., Domestic Violence, in Family Violence: A Clinical and Legal Guide 141 (Sandra
J. Kaplan ed., 1996). See also Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? 1-2 (Eve S.
& Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) ("About one in five females victimized by her spouse or
former spouse reported that, in the past 6 months, she had been the victim of a series
of three or more assaults ...."); Donald G. Dutton, The Batterer 176 (BasicBooks
1995) ("[l]n our interviews with [battered] partners ... we found that for each arrest,
there had been 30 attacks."); Albert R. Roberts, Duration and Severity of Woman
Battering, in Handbook of Domestic Violence Intervention Strategies 68 (Albert R.
Roberts ed., 2002) (describing the rate of "chronic abuse" among a sample population
of battered women).
285. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
sufficient an indictment that alleged that incidents of child sexual abuse occurred
"during the month of November 1980").
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as to negate the effectiveness of nearly any alibi, no matter how
ironclad.25 '
Also, where consciousness-of-guilt evidence and evidence of motive
and identity (the "0 + 0" of the Bierenbaum equation) are present,
there will be a significant lack of impetus for law enforcement to
search for corroborating forensics. The Bierenbaum logic that
summarily concludes murder when 1) a person disappears, and 2)
character evidence points ineluctably to one suspect, provides law
enforcement, especially in times of reduced funding and higher
demand, with a smoking gun. This smoking gun makes forensics,
which can be not only expensive and time-consuming, but also subject
to strong rebuttal by expert testimony in court, less attractive in such a
situation. Given, however, that physical evidence has provided the
moral and legal underpinnings for several bodiless murder cases in
New York (such as Lipsky and Siefert), the continued need for
forensics is clear.
Lastly, in relation to bodiless murder per se, as both the reach of
law enforcement and the frequency of murder charges in missing
persons cases increase, the actions of both law enforcement and
prosecuting attorneys will begin, in the public's eyes, to appear
arbitrary. Rarely does a person go missing where evidence cannot be
assembled to show that someone, somewhere 1) showed a suspicious
lack of affect in response to the disappearance, and 2) had the motive
and opportunity to have killed that person. If a successful prosecution
can be mounted against Bierenbaum, however, after the investigation
lay cold for fifteen years, the question arises as to why cases such as
the disappearance of Kristine Kupka, who went missing after
allegedly going to meet her ex-boyfriend, Darshanand Persaud, on
October 24, 1998, should remain unprosecuted.8 7 In the face of a
media barrage, Persaud has remained tight-lipped. Added to this lack
of public response, evidence exists that Persaud had motive, since he
had allegedly impregnated Kupka while married to another woman.2
Evidence also exists that the two quarreled because of the pregnancy
and that Kupka feared that Persaud might harm her. 2' 9 Lastly, and
perhaps most damningly, Persaud was the person with whom Kupka
was last seen alive. Although there is no direct or physical evidence
that Kupka was murdered or even dead, the Bierenbauni decision not
only makes a murder charge reasonable, it mandates one. If
prosecutors fail to bring such a charge in the Kupka disappearance, or
286. This would have been necessary in Bierenbauni, had the defense not conceded
that Gail Katz Bierenbaum died on July 7, 1985-the date she was last seen.
287. See Joseph P. Fried, Following Up, N.Y. Times, Mar, 17, 2002, at 39.
288. See id.; see also What Happened to Kristine Kupka?, at
http://www.kristinekupka.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
289. See What Happened to Kristine Kupka?, at http://www.kristinekupka.com (last
visited Mar. 27, 2003).
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in the many other similar missing persons cases, public trust in the
actions of law enforcement could decline accordingly. 2911
2. The Effect of Bierenbaum as an Evidentiary Precedent Generally
As shown in Part II.C, the math of Bierenbaum is doubly faulty.
Not only does it, as Professor Abramovsky suggests, combine
previously insufficient types of evidence to add up to sufficiency for a
finding of guilt (0 + 0 = 1), it allows such evidence to also bootstrap in
the very existence of a crime, its corpus delicti (adding 0 + 0, or
consciousness of guilt and motive and opportunity, to equal 2, or
corpus delicti and guilt). In this way, Bierenbaum completely
undermines the already weakened prohibition of the use of character
evidence in a prosecution's case in chief. The resulting danger that a
defendant could be convicted-not for the crime charged, but for
previous bad acts-is exemplified in Bierenbaum. Of course,
whenever character evidence of previous acts of domestic violence is
admitted, it is usually accompanied by the limiting instruction that it
only be used for the permissible ends of establishing motive, intent or
identity and not for the impermissible end of presuming guilt.291 In
such a case, however, evidence of previous acts of domestic violence
can be so appalling that it becomes prejudicial. Limiting instructions
themselves are often exercises in legal fiction.29 2 A juror cannot un-
hear evidence he or she has heard, nor completely restrict character
evidence to its permissible ends. 293 When that evidence is especially
prejudicial, as it was in Bierenbaum, it should be excluded.2' 4 But
Bierenbaum ignores the tenuous fiction of limiting instructions and
argues instead that where such evidence is of greatest effect, it should
do two jobs at once. It should not only establish guilt, but also
bootstrap in the very occurrence of the crime in question.
290. The alternate side of this danger is that such cases will be effectively tried in
the media. Bierenbaum, Kirnes and the Kupka disappearance were all highly
publicized and the alleged wrongdoers, including Persaud, were vilified in the press.
As recent experience has shown, especially in disappearance cases such as that
involving Chandra Levy or Jonlenet Ramsey, the media can quickly turn anyone
with either motive or opportunity into a public villain. Where, as is the case now, a
Bierenbaum is convicted but someone like Persaud never even charged, the risk is
high that public trust in law enforcement will be significantly undermined.
291. See Fisch, supra note 75, § 16. An attorney must usually motion for such a
limiting instruction but a court must apply one sua sponte where "failure to so advise
the jury would deprive the [defendant] of a fair trial." Id.
292. On the boundaries of this fiction and the confusion limiting instructions can
cause, see Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 176 n.2 (1997).
293. On the balancing test required in the admission of evidence subject to a
limiting instruction, see McCormick on Evidence § 59 (5th ed. 1999).




In response to the dangers outlined above, either the Court of
Appeals or the New York legislature must act to close the
Bierenbaum loophole. Since any statute putting barriers in the way of
a prosecution for murder would be difficult, if not impossible, to pass
in the current political climate, the onus falls on the Court of Appeals.
In taking on this task, however, the court would still have to confront
1) the unsavory nature of most defendants in bodiless murder cases,
especially where domestic violence is involved, as well as 2) the
LipskylPalmer policy argument that those who are especially good at
disposing of their victims should not receive the windfall of immunity
from prosecution. Both the import Bierenbaum has for the future of
bodiless murder jurisprudence and its general evidentiary
repercussions make some sort of response a necessity.
1. The Response Required by the Court of Appeals
The pressure facing the Court of Appeals with the current state of
the law is not new. Indeed, it was the very danger of a miscarriage of
justice in bodiless murder cases which led to Lord Hale's call for
deliberation and, correlatively, to the development of the moral
certainty safeguard in wholly circumstantial cases. With that
safeguard effectively dismantled2 ' and the door to the prosecution of
bodiless murder left wide open after Bierenbaum,2" the risk of
injustice is great. The policy arguments that moved Lord Hale, i.e.,
that the danger of a false conviction outweighed the need to bring a
murderer to justice, are as applicable now as they were in the
seventeenth century. The dangers of a nigh insurmountable
presumption of guilt or of the complete erosion of the ban on
character evidence in the prosecution's case in chief arguably
outweigh the utility in bringing a very small subclass of suspected
murders to justice.
Other mechanisms exist, such as increased use of forensic
investigation and the lower standard of proof for the corroborations
of confessions or admissions, to help ensure that the number of actual
murderers who escape justice when the bodies of their victims cannot
be found is as low as possible. Although odds are that despite its
deficiencies, the Bierenbaum decision will survive further appeal, the
Court of Appeals could choose to follow the long-held tradition in
bodiless murder cases of setting out guidelines for future decisions in
dicta.
Even if the Court of Appeals hears and affirms Bierenbaum, the
court should restrict its holding to the facts. It should identify that
295. See supra Part I.B.
296. Seesupra Part I.C.
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both consciousness-of-guilt evidence and evidence of motive and
opportunity are still insufficient to prove guilt in New York. It should
also state that absent other proof of a crime, they are not, in
themselves, sufficient to show that such a crime occurred. Lastly, the
court should insist that special attention be given to the prejudicial
nature of character evidence when 1) it is especially damning and 2) it
is used to cover up a lack of or defect in the prosecution's proof of
corpus delicti.
The court should also stress the importance of deliberation in all
cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence, not just those
involving bodiless murder. Even though the moral certainty
safeguard was ostensibly weakened in People v. Sanchez and the
subsequent revision of the Criminal Jury Instructions ("CJI2d"),
lower courts still rely widely on its wisdom. The Court of Appeals
could take the opportunity in any appeal involving a bodiless murder
case (and there are sure to be many after Bierenbaum) to reiterate
that circumstantial evidence points to a limited set of permissible
inferences and that where a case against a defendant is entirely
circumstantial, the danger is high that an impermissible inference will
slip into a jury's decision-making process. By doing so, the Court will
be able to maintain the liberal application of the Hale/Hindmarsh rule
effected by Lipsky, while reducing the risk that especially damning
circumstantial evidence (such as the character evidence outlined
above) becomes prejudicial.
The reasoning that supports these proposed remedies is an old one,
present in Lord Hale's recognition that any reticence toward
prosecuting murder in the absence of a body should be tempered by
the common sense of Hindmarsh. It has also played a long and
important role in New York jurisprudence, as evinced by early
commentators such as Wills, Greenleaf, Russell and Starkie,297 the
development of the moral certainty safeguard, and the important dicta
in Lipsky. It should not be discarded simply for the argument,
however compelling, that no murderer should escape justice.
2. Examples from Other Jurisdictions
Because truly bodiless murder cases (absent not only a body, but
also a confession or any physical trace of a crime) are so rare, it is not
surprising that no other U.S. court has dealt extensively with the
unique issues raised in Bierenbaum. Despite this paucity of
precedent, two jurisdictions, California and Michigan, do provide us
with examples of the kind of action the Court of Appeals could take
when faced with a bodiless murder case. In California, the landmark
case People v. Scott and its progeny suggest that moral certainty still
297. See Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179, 194-95 (1858) (containing an overview of
Starkie's view on bodiless murder); supra notes 187, 190.
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211has an important role to play in such cases. In Michigan, the case of
People v. Fisher9 explicitly rejected the same 0 + 0 = 1 math relied
upon in Bierenbaum. Perhaps by examining these two cases, the
Court of Appeals can come to some middle ground-balancing its
compelling interest in punishing murderers for their crimes with the
need for caution in cases built entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
In Scott, a jury convicted a man for the murder of his wife, even
though her body was never found.'... To bolster its case, the
prosecution relied on personal items owned by the victim, such as
dentures and eyeglasses, which police found buried in a lot adjoining
the Scott's property and which the victim would have needed had she
disappeared of her own accord."" The prosecution also submitted
evidence that strongly suggested that Mr. Scott knew his wife was
dead. 302
Scott is generally regarded as the first case in the United States that
upheld a conviction for murder in absence of a body, forensics or any
direct evidence whatsoever. Yet in fashioning its decision, the Scott
court included a discussion on the dangers inherent to cases, especially
those involving homicide, built entirely on circumstantial evidence.
On this point, Scott quoted a New Zealand case, Rex v. Horry, which
stated:
There may be other facts so incriminating and so incapable of any
reasonable explanation as to be incompatible with any hypothesis
other than murder. It is in accord both with principle and with
authority that the fact of death should be provable by such
circumstances as render it morally certain and leave no ground for
reasonable doubt-that the circumstantial evidence should be so
cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational
hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for .... [I]t
was competent for the jury to infer the fact of death from the whole
of the evidence as a matter of moral certainty leaving no ground for
reasonable doubt. 4
By relying on Horry, Scott incorporated the moral certainty
safeguard into the jurisprudence of bodiless murder in California.
The cases which followed Scott, whether or not they make specific
reference to moral certainty, were all bound by its logic and its call for
298. See, e.g., People v. Scott, I Cal. Rptr. 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Scott's
progeny include People v. Martinez, 2002 WL 749398 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2002);
Matthews v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v.
Manson, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); and People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr.
347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
299. 483 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Scott, I Cal. Rptr. at 603.
301. Id. at 608.
302. See id. at 623.
303. See id. at 603 ("The case in hand is without precedent in this country.").
304. Id. at 621-22 (quoting Rex v. Horry, [19521 N.Z.L.R. 111).
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caution. In Scott, of course, the defendant was found guilty, yet the
California Supreme Court was still able to voice its concern and stress
its reliance on the moral certainty safeguard. Any appeal to
Bierenbaum could well do the same.
In Fisher, the Michigan Court of Appeals examined a fact pattern
similar to that in Bierenbaum, but it reached an entirely different
result. Nine years after his wife went missing, the defendant, Jerry
Wayne Fisher, was charged with murdering her and disposing of her
body.3 5 Police were unable to find any trace of Ms. Fisher's body, or
evidence that any crime had been committed.3"6 The Fishers, like the
Bierenbaums, had a history of marital strife.3" 7 Mr. Fisher had also,
like Bierenbaum, been accused of beating his wife.3"" At trial, Fisher
was, again like Bierenbaum, confronted with inconsistent statements,
lies he told regarding his wife's disappearance, and evidence tending
to show motive, opportunity and the fact that he knew the victim was
dead .309
Although he had been charged with murder, the trial court found
Mr. Fisher guilty of the lesser included charge of involuntary
manslaughter. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed
the case for insufficient evidence. In its decision, the court stressed
the due process requirement that all elements of a crime be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. It also made clear that "[m]otive and
opportunity, while relevant, are not elements of any crime. '' 31" Lastly,
it stressed the danger inherent in using character evidence to prove
motive, intent or identity. Although such usage is generally accepted,
it brings with it the danger that 1) prior bad acts will be used as
impermissible propensity evidence and 2) the protective barrier of a
limiting instruction will not hold.
Based on previous New York decisions, the Court of Appeals
should be able to find some middle ground between Scott and Fisher.
Lipsky is an example of that middle ground. There, the court was
able to find a defendant guilty (albeit with the help of a confession)
using a broad, interpretive version of the HalelHindmarsh rule.3"' The
court could maintain the advances it made in Lipsky, yet avoid the
dangers of Bierenbaumn, if it tempers its Lipsky reasoning with 1) the
cautiousness encouraged by the moral certainty safeguard and 2) the
recognition that, although relevant, neither motive, opportunity nor
character evidence can, alone or in concert, bootstrap the corpus
delicti of the crime charged.
305. People v. Fisher, 483 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
306. See id. at 453.
307. See id. at 452-53.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 454.
310. Id.
311. See supra Part lI.B.
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If it did so, the Court of Appeals would be able to strike that elusive
balance that courts have failed to achieve in over two centuries of
bodiless murder jurisprudence. It could satisfy both the need to
punish murderers, no matter how good they are at disposing of their
victims' bodies, and the need to safeguard other areas of the law, such
as the rules of evidence and notions of due process, from dangerous
erosion. The law supporting this balance is already on the books in
New York. The onus now falls on the Court of Appeals to recognize
the dangers created by the Bierenbaum decision and fashion its
response accordingly.
CONCLUSION
For something that happens so infrequently, a bodiless murder trial
can be of great precedential import. As this Comment has
endeavored to show, a variety of complex legal issues converge in
bodiless murder cases. Therefore, as the jurisprudence of bodiless
murder develops, it has a palpable effect on criminal law as a whole.
As outlined in Part I, the history of the cautious HalelHindmarsh rule
has intertwined itself with the two step process of circumstantial
evidence and the moral certainty safeguard. In New York, however,
courts have applied the HalelHindmarsh rule in a varied manner. As
Part II shows, this variance resembles a pendulum swing, first (in
Ruloff) moving away from the broad, policy driven interpretivism
applied by Justice Story in Gibert, then back to the center in Lipsky,
and then, most recently, discarding the Hale/Hindmarsh rule
altogether in Bierenbaum.
This final rejection of the HalelHindmarsh rule has created dangers
that reach well beyond the boundaries of bodiless murder
jurisprudence. As Part III shows, Bierenbaum not only allows a court
to bootstrap a guilty verdict based on previously insufficient forms of
evidence, it also creates a presumption of guilt, based on character
evidence, in domestic violence cases where an abused partner goes
missing. Given the often gruesome facts surrounding bodiless murder
cases, it is difficult to inspire enthusiasm for any change which would
make it more difficult to convict for murder when no direct evidence
of a crime exists. Yet, when one weighs the issues surrounding the
prosecution of bodiless murder in the balance, they evince a
continuing need for both caution and, most of all, thoughtful
deliberation.
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